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INTRODUCTION
“[N]o matter how those who may not want to support this legis-
lation attempt to distort its intent, no matter how many times these
issues are raised on the Senate floor, they do not apply. The defini-
tions are clear.”
~ Senator Edward Kennedy, on the Americans with Disabilities
Act1
“The road to enactment of this legislation was not easy. But in
the process of reaching this goal, we have all learned something about
the evils of discrimination in any form, and the importance of judging
individuals by their abilities—not patronizing misconceptions,
demeaning stereotypes, and irrational fears about their disabilities.”
~ Senator Edward Kennedy, on the Americans with Disabilities
Act2
Senator Ted Kennedy will forever be remembered as a master
architect of legislation who aimed to right societal inequities. He will
also be remembered as a champion of those who lacked access and
entre´e to public life and all of its privileges, including employment. In
the 1970s, his tireless efforts resulted in a large-scale overhaul of the
federal sentencing guidelines and reform of the Federal Criminal
Code.3 In 1985, he worked with Representative Patricia Schroeder to
improve the lives of military families through a bill that facilitated
government employment for military spouses, the proliferation of
childcare programs for military families, and reduced costs for those
programs.4 The senator noted that “everywhere I go, I find family is-
sues on the top of the agenda—housing, permanent change of station,
day care, spouse employment, education for the children . . . . The
readiness and morale of our troops is critically dependent on the well-
being of their family members.”5
1. 135 CONG. REC. S10772 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy),
reprinted in 6 BERNARD D. REAMS JR. ET. AL., DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF
1990, PUBLIC LAW 101-336 (1992). Senator Kennedy’s quote was responding to a
debate about whether HIV-positive individuals or AIDS carriers were covered under
the bill as disabled. In the end, HIV-positive/AIDS patients were “included among the
handicapped, gaining them the protection against discrimination that had been
dropped from the 1988 AIDS bill.” ADAM CLYMER, EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A BIOG-
RAPHY 454 (1999).
2. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 2 (1997) [hereinafter EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY] .
3. BELLA ENGLISH ET AL., LAST LION 204 (Peter S. Cannelos ed., 2009).
4. CLYMER, supra note 1, at 383–84 (1999).
5. Id.
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Although Senator Kennedy cared deeply about the efforts to im-
prove the lives of military families, it is his work on and in support of
the Americans with Disabilities Act6 (ADA), one of the most sweep-
ing and influential civil rights bills of the last century,7 that appears to
have resonated most deeply with him on a personal level.8
Senator Kennedy was the youngest of nine children in what is
probably the best-known political family in American history.9 He had
a son who lost a leg to a rare form of cancer that required what in
1973 was considered “cutting edge therapy,”10 a wife who struggled
with and was treated for alcoholism,11 and a sister who was rendered
severely disabled following a failed lobotomy.12 According to a biog-
rapher, “[h]elping people with disabilities was a personal issue for
Ted,” and the ADA was “an example of how Ted’s charm and intimi-
dation could push through landmark bills . . . [and] a law that Ted
considered one of the most important civil rights measures of his ca-
reer.”13 Having made some strides toward strengthening the rights of
the disabled prior to his work on the ADA, he “longed for something
more sweeping: a federal law that would protect disabled Americans
from job discrimination and guarantee them access to a long list of
public and private facilities.”14
The senator set to work, inviting key players on the legislative
landscape to his home, building bridges and support across the table at
meals, and identifying potential foes of the legislation, so that he, in
his usual style, could be proactive about eliminating obstacles to his
goal and facilitate the legislation’s passage.15 Kennedy believed the
bill could become “one of the great civil rights laws of our genera-
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
7. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 36–37 (2004)
[ hereinafter RIGHTING THE ADA].
8. See ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 3, at 318 (“Helping people with disabilities was R
a personal issue for Ted.”).
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id. at 188.
11. Id. at 190.
12. Id. at 318–21; Miranda Oshige Mcgowan, Reconsidering the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 33 (2000) (describing the beginnings of the ADA
and discussing Senator Kennedy’s involvement, as well as briefly discussing how
Senator Kennedy, as well as “[a]lmost everyone involved in the ADA had a close
family member or friend who was disabled”).
13. ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 3, at 318. R
14. Id. at 318–19; see also CLYMER, supra note 1, at 446  (“A 1973 law barred
discrimination against the handicapped in programs with federal aid, but it lacked the
broad protections against discrimination won by blacks and women.”).
15. ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 3, at 319–20. R
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tion,” and promoted the legislation as a “bill of rights” and “an eman-
cipation proclamation” for people with disabilities.16
The legislation, however, was not without its problems and pit-
falls. Almost twenty years after the ADA was enacted, President
George W. Bush, the son of the president who had signed the ADA
into law, signed into law the Americans with Disabilities Act Amend-
ments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).17 Its purpose was to afford broader
protections to disabled workers and to correct the damage done by
court rulings that had created too many loopholes and injustices.18 Yet
the ADAAA, too, has its limitations and its omissions.
Although the ADAAA has made great strides in the direction of
removing unnecessary barriers to employees’ coverage under the
ADA,19 it has largely failed to address the ADA’s “reasonable accom-
modation”20 mandate and to redress the damage done by courts’ ADA
jurisprudence. Indeed, the body of reasonable accommodation analysis
has suffered due to the large number of cases disposed of based upon
coverage issues, the tendency of judges to be conclusory and furnish
scant and opaque analyses, and the lack of guidance provided by the
statute itself and by the Supreme Court.
This Article advocates several ways to reform the statute and its
jurisprudence. It begins with the premise that the “otherwise quali-
fied,” “reasonable accommodation,” and “undue hardship” analyses
are questions that call for a focus on, respectively, the plaintiff at is-
sue, the accommodation at issue, and the employer at issue. The arti-
cle calls for the abolition of the need to demonstrate a major life
activity limitation required for coverage under the statute in accommo-
dation cases, noting that this has already effectively occurred in the
context of the rest of the ADA’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence. It
also suggests that the “otherwise qualified” analysis, derived from the
16. RIGHTING THE ADA, supra note 7, at 34 (“Senator Edward M. Kennedy termed R
the legislation a ‘bill of rights’ and ‘an emancipation proclamation’ for people with
disabilities.”); CLYMER, supra note 1, at 454 (“In his opening speech, Kennedy said
the bill could become ‘one of the great civil rights laws of our generation. . . . This
legislation is a bill of rights for the disabled . . . .’”); see also id. at 452 (Opening a
full committee meeting, Ted Kennedy “call[ed] [the bill] no more than ‘simple jus-
tice’ for 43 million Americans and reminded everyone again that ‘President Bush
shares my commitment to integrating disabled Americans into the mainstream of our
society’” and “emphasized how much of the bill was drawn from . . . other civil rights
measures”).
17. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
18. See id. § 2(b)(3).
19. This Article focuses on the employment provisions of Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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statute, be given a stronger role in both the overall analysis and the
screening of appropriate plaintiffs and cases. It further urges that the
“essential functions” language in the statute’s definition of an “other-
wise qualified” plaintiff be changed so as to evaluate the plaintiff’s
possession of essential, necessary, or valued skills.
This Article aims to do this without the benefit of a wealth of
case law that actually applies the ADAAA to existing jurisprudence,
as the ADAAA is not retroactive.21 It proceeds, however, to honor the
ideals, energy, and vision of Senator Kennedy, a steadfast advocate of
implementing radical change to dismantle barriers and enable justice.
I.
BACKGROUND
The ADA’s legacy is enshrined in American society, and it goes
far beyond the “[m]illions of access ramps, wheelchair-accessible
restrooms, hand-operated amplifiers in movie theaters, and other ac-
commodations,”22 which are most visible. It transformed attitudes, ex-
pectations, and the status quo to such an extent that the inclusion of
the disabled in public life has become much more commonplace,
rather than an extraordinary act. The statute represented “transition
from a fragmented national disability policy, which often worked to
the detriment of people with disabilities, to an affirmation of the basic
civil rights of persons with disabilities . . . .”23 Moreover, were it not
for the extraordinary efforts of leaders in the disability community and
champions of the legislation in Congress, like Senator Kennedy, the
ADA likely would never have been enacted.24
However, judicial resistance to the widespread relief the statute’s
original champions intended to afford resulted in doctrines and inter-
pretations of the ADA that thwarted, rather than advanced, its goals.25
21. Courts have consistently held that the ADAAA is not retroactively applied. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Agro Dist. LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313 (1994) (“Even when Congress intends to
supersede a rule of law embodied in one of our decisions with what it views as a
better rule established in earlier decisions, its intent to reach conduct preceding the
‘corrective’ amendment must clearly appear.”)); Milholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 565 (6th Cir. 2009); Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572
F.3d 936, 939–42 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Kieseteter v. Catepillar, Inc., 295 F.App’x 850,
851 (9th Cir. 2009).
22. ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 3, at 321. R
23. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 2, at xii.
24. See id. at xvii.
25. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisci-
plinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7 (2000) (“As judicial opinions in Title I cases began to accumu-
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The amendments were enacted to rectify this situation, expand cover-
age, and reaffirm the statute’s mission.26
A. Senator Kennedy and the ADA
In a nation where at-will employment is the background pre-
sumption atop which all employment discrimination legislation is
written, outlining the contours of protective legislation becomes criti-
cally important. Absent protection specifically afforded to employees
with disabilities, an employer could legally discriminate against, fail
to accommodate, or even terminate an employee who is not deemed
optimally “able” to perform his or her job within whatever constraints
the employer imposes upon employees and utilizing only whatever
tools or resources the employer sees fit to provide.27
late, it became clear that the Act was not being interpreted as its drafters and support-
ers within the disability rights movement had planned.”); see also Jeannette Cox,
Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 201
(2010) (“As a result of [the] restrictive interpretations of the ADA’s protected class, a
2007 study suggested that federal courts had effectively limited the ADA’s protected
class to a category of persons that would have extreme difficulty demonstrating that
they are qualified to work, even with the provision of ADA accommodations.”).
26. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a), Pub. L.
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (“Congress finds that—(1) in enacting the [ADA],
Congress intended that the Act ‘provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities’ and provide
broad coverage; (2) in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and
mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all as-
pects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently
precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to
remove societal and institutional barriers; (3) while Congress expected that the defini-
tion of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts
had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, that expectation has not been fulfilled.”).
27. The ADA prohibits, among other things: (1) “not making reasonable accommo-
dations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the opera-
tion of the business of such covered entity,” and (2) “denying employment opportuni-
ties to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasona-
ble accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or appli-
cant.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2006). See generally Pamela S. Karlan &
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46
DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1996) (“[T]he ADA declares it illegal to deny an individual an em-
ployment opportunity by failing to take account of her disability when taking account
of it—in the sense of changing the job or physical environment of the workplace—
would enable her to do the work.”); Kelly Cahill Timmons, Limiting “Limitations”:
The Scope of the Duty of Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 313, 323 (2005) (“Even though there may be a cost-
benefit limit on the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation, and even though
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The ADA was enacted in 1990 in order to meet what Congress
termed a “compelling need” for a “clear and comprehensive national
mandate” to prevent discrimination against the disabled.28 In further-
ance of this end, the ADA prohibits discrimination against the dis-
abled “in major areas of public life”29 including employment (Title
I),30 public services (Title II),31 and public accommodations (Title
III).32 This Article focuses on the employment title of the ADA (Title
I). The ADA covers all individuals who are otherwise qualified to per-
form their jobs, meaning those who can perform the essential func-
tions of their jobs with or without reasonable accommodation, but
whose mental or physical impairments amount to disabilities within
the meaning of the act, meaning that the impairments substantially
limit one or more of their major life activities.33
When the primary co-sponsor of the bill, Senator Lowell Weicker
of Connecticut, was not re-elected to the Senate in 1988, Senator Ken-
nedy and other staunch proponents of the legislation stepped in to
champion it.34 Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, the bill’s chief supporter
after Senator Weicker’s departure, worked to procure Senator Ken-
nedy’s support, knowing that his support “could improve the possibil-
ity of a smooth and quick transition to the Senate floor.”35 After he
and Senator Harkin concluded that the bill needed to be rewritten to
survive in the Senate, Senator Kennedy worked tirelessly to rewrite
the ADA;36 it would pass by a vote of 76–8 in the Senate in 1989 and
a vote of 403–20 in the House of Representatives in 1990.37 The sena-
tors employed what they called a “four pronged legislative strategy”:
(1) nurturing support for the bill in the business community, the disa-
courts have held that some accommodations are unreasonable as a matter of law, it is
important to recognize the significance of the duty and its utility to disabled employ-
ees. Outside the context of the ADA, employees generally must take jobs and work-
places as they find them.”).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990).
29. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006).
31. Id. §§ 12131–12165.
32. Id. §§ 12181–12189.
33. See id. § 12102; see also Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp.
1418, 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“The individual must be able to perform the essential
functions of the position either with a reasonable accommodation, if such an accom-
modation is necessary for the person to be able to perform the essential functions, or
without reasonable accommodation, if accommodation is not necessary for the person
to be able to perform the essential functions.”).
34. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 2, at 77–78.
35. Id. at 78.
36. Id. at 79.
37. Id. at xx.
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bility community, Congress, and within the Bush administration; (2)
facilitating compromises prior to the new bill’s introduction so that it
would pass Congress’s scrutiny; (3) & (4) using and encouraging
modesty and parity, meaning that the bill, rather than fostering drastic
and immediate change, would engender “accessibility at some point in
time.”38
Although Senator Harkin was the bill’s Senate sponsor, Senator
Kennedy, a senior senator and the chairman of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, took a lead role in the negotiation of
the bill with the Bush administration.39 According to one author,
“[Senator] Kennedy’s plan of attack was to get all parties into the
same room and essentially stay there until all issues were resolved.”40
On August 2, 1989, his bipartisan committee approved the ADA unan-
imously, 16–0, in large part because so many potential issues had been
proactively identified and dealt with and so many senators respected
and thus deferred to Senators Harkin and Kennedy.41
The statute was ultimately enacted, as it recites, due to Con-
gress’s recognition that “physical or mental disabilities in no way di-
minish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, yet
many people with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded
from doing so because of discrimination; others who have a record of
a disability or are regarded as having a disability also have been sub-
jected to discrimination.”42
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against indi-
viduals with disabilities who are qualified to perform the essential
functions of their jobs. It defines a “qualified individual with a disabil-
ity” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasona-
ble accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”43 One is
38. Id. at 79.
39. Id. at 95.
40. Id.; see also CLYMER, supra note 1, at 452–53 (“Kennedy and Sununu [a signif-
icant opponent in the Bush administration] agreed to oppose any changes once they
made a deal . . . . There were ten negotiating sessions in July [and] [t]he point was to
see if all the remaining differences could be settled, or at least narrowed.”).
41. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 2, at 97.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2006).
43. Id. § 12111(8) (“The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this sub-
chapter, consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions
of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions of the job.”).
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disabled within the meaning of the statute if he or she has “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [his or
her] major life activities,” “a record of such an impairment,” or is
“regarded as having such an impairment.”44
The dual mandates of the ADA are those of nondiscrimination
and reasonable accommodation.45 Under the statute, an employer must
refrain from discrimination with respect to the terms and conditions of
the employment of those deemed disabled, regarded as disabled, or
with a record of a disability, as defined by the statute.46 Under most
circumstances, it is a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail to
provide “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” un-
less the employer is able to show that the proposed accommodation
would impose an undue hardship upon the operation of its business.47
Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include any
kind of alteration to the workplace environment and may encompass:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restruc-
44. Id. § 12102(1). While the statute does not define “impairment,” the EEOC has
given some guidance on what constitutes a physical or mental impairment:
Physical or mental impairment means: (1) Any physiological disorder, or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, spe-
cial sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and
endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and spe-
cific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2010); see also Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Mis-
conduct under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 190–93
(2005) (discussing what it means to be a qualified individual with a disability).
45. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommoda-
tion, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) (looking
to debunk the idea that there is a major difference between the accommodation and
antidiscrimination requirements of the ADA).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”).
47. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (“‘[D]iscriminat[ion] against a qualified individual
on the basis of disability’ includes . . . not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disa-
bility who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity; or denying employment opportunities to a job appli-
cant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such
denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation
to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant.”).
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turing, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a va-
cant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpret-
ers, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.48
However, an employer need not provide what may otherwise be
viewed as a reasonable accommodation if it “can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
[its] business.”49 When determining whether a particular accommoda-
tion would cause an undue hardship, the following factors are to be
considered:
(1) The overall size of the [employer]’s program with respect to
number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of
budget; (2) The type of the [employer]’s operation, including the
composition and structure of the [employer]’s workforce; and (3)
The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.50
B. Confusion in the Courts and Dissention among Scholars:
Problematic Cases and Scholarly Debates Surrounding
Reasonable Accommodation Cases in the Years
Leading up to the ADAAA
There has been longstanding debate and confusion among courts
as to the precise relationship between the “reasonable accommoda-
tion” and “undue hardship” analyses and as to the assignment of bur-
dens of production and persuasion. Judge Calabresi of the Second
Circuit observed in 1995 that:
“Reasonable” is a relational term: it evaluates the desirability of a
particular accommodation according to the consequences that the
accommodation will produce. This requires an inquiry not only into
the benefits of the accommodation but into its costs as well . . . . In
short, an accommodation is reasonable only if its costs are not
clearly disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce.51
The Second Circuit has held that the plaintiff bears a modest bur-
den of production to demonstrate that an accommodation is reasonable
by “suggest[ing] the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs
of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits.”52 Once this is
48. Id. § 12111(9).
49. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
50. 28 C.F.R. § 42.511(c) (2010).
51. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995).
52. Id.
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done, “the risk of nonpersuasion falls on the defendant,”53 which is to
say that “the defendant’s burden of persuading the factfinder that the
plaintiff’s proposed accommodation is unreasonable merges, in effect,
with its burden of showing, as an affirmative defense, that the pro-
posed accommodation would cause it to suffer an undue hardship.”54
This analysis underscores Judge Calabresi’s belief that “in practice
meeting the burden of nonpersuasion on the reasonableness of the ac-
commodation and demonstrating that the accommodation imposes an
undue hardship amount to the same thing.”55
Thus, the relevant analysis, as envisioned by the Second Circuit,
would go as follows:
First, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is otherwise
qualified; if an accommodation is needed, the plaintiff must show,
as part of her burden of persuasion, that an effective accommoda-
tion exists that would render her otherwise qualified. On the issue
of reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff bears only the burden of
identifying an accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not
clearly exceed its benefits . . . . District courts will not be required
to instruct juries on how to apply complex economic formulae; a
common-sense balancing of the costs and benefits in light of the
factors listed in the regulations is all that is expected.56
Other courts, however, have heavily criticized this approach. The
Eleventh Circuit, for example, has stated that “[s]uch an approach
confuses an element of the plaintiff’s case (reasonable accommoda-
tion) with an affirmative defense (undue burden) and effectively re-
lieves the plaintiff of her obligation to prove her case.”57
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett58 is the only Supreme Court decision
that has interpreted the duty of reasonable accommodation.59 In Bar-
nett, the Supreme Court held that a proposed accommodation’s sub-
version of the operation of seniority rules will usually be adequate to
demonstrate that as a matter of law, the accommodation is not reason-
able, although the employer retains the ability to proffer evidence of
circumstances that would render an exception to a seniority rule rea-
53. Id. (citing Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 642 (2d Cir. 1991)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 139–40.
57. Willis v. Conopco, 108 F.3d 282, 286 (11th Cir. 1997).
58. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
59. See generally Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassign-
ment Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested
Solution After U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931 (2003) (discussing
Barnett at length and analyzing the questions answered by the Court, as well as the
questions left unanswered in the opinion).
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sonable in a given case.60 The Court also gave insights into how the
reasonable accommodation/undue hardship analysis ought to be car-
ried out. Specifically, the Court acknowledged that deciding whether
the proposed accommodation was reasonable may be distilled down to
the more fundamental question “of how the Act treats workplace
‘preferences.’”61
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the statute’s
mandate was merely to even the playing field for the disabled, render-
ing them “equal” but not favored:
While linguistically logical, this argument fails to recognize what
the Act specifies, namely, that preferences will sometimes prove
necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal. The
Act requires preferences in the form of “reasonable accommoda-
tions” that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same
workplace opportunities that those without disabilities automati-
cally enjoy. By definition any special “accommodation” requires
the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e.,
preferentially. And the fact that the difference in treatment violates
an employer’s disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the ac-
commodation beyond the Act’s potential reach . . . . The simple
fact that an accommodation would provide a “preference”—in the
sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate a
rule that others must obey—cannot, in and of itself, automatically
show that the accommodation is not “reasonable.”62
The Court also rejected the notion that the term “reasonable ac-
commodation” was merely a “redundant mirror image of the term ‘un-
due hardship.’”
The statute refers to an “undue hardship on the operation of the
business.” . . . Yet a demand for an effective accommodation could
prove unreasonable because of its impact, not on business opera-
tions, but on fellow employees-say, because it will lead to dismis-
sals, relocations, or modification of employee benefits to which an
employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of the busi-
ness itself, may be relatively indifferent.63
Thus, according to the Court, in order to defeat an employer’s
motion for summary judgment, an ADA plaintiff “need only show that
an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in
the run of cases.”64 Then, the defendant entity needs to point to “spe-
60. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406.
61. Id. at 397.
62. Id. at 397–98.
63. Id. at 400–01.
64. Id. at 401.
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cial (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue
hardship in the particular circumstances.”65 This has been the most
recent and most detailed guidance furnished to date by the Supreme
Court as to how, precisely, the “reasonable accommodation” analysis
should be conducted.
Despite the guidance furnished by the Supreme Court in Barnett,
courts continue to struggle with and disagree over the correct way to
evaluate whether certain proposed accommodations are reasonable ac-
commodations or whether they confer an undue hardship upon em-
ployers. For example, courts continue to disagree on whether
mandatory reassignments are reasonable accommodations.66
Scholars and commentators, too, have grappled with the appro-
priate relationship between the reasonable accommodation analysis
and the undue hardship analysis.67 Professor Alex Long has urged
judges to focus on the ramifications that a proposed accommodation
could create for other employees.68 Professor Mark Weber, for his
part, argues that:
65. Id. at 402.
66. The courts of appeals have split on the issue of whether the ADA requires
mandatory reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. Compare Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (requiring reassign-
ment), and Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304–06 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (requiring reassignment), with Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480,
483 (8th Cir. 2007) (“We . . .  conclude the ADA is not an affirmative action statute
and does not require an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a va-
cant position when such a reassignment would violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
policy of the employer to hire the most qualified candidate.”), and EEOC v. Humis-
ton-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (allowing an employer to
choose to not reassign an employee). For additional discussion of the Barnett decision
and the circuit split, see Nicholas A. Dorsey, Note, Mandatory Reassignment Under
the ADA: The Circuit Split and Need for a Socio-Political Understanding of Disabil-
ity, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 457–67 (2009) (discussing the circuit split); Befort,
supra note 59, at 931 (examining the Barnett decision, attempting to answer some R
unanswered questions left open by the Court); Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes
Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Ac-
commodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1083–86
(2000) (arguing that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement differs signif-
icantly from conventional forms of affirmative action).
67. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 397, 399–400 (1995) (argu-
ing that Congress’s adoption of a “vague standard [for undue hardship] was a serious
mistake” and “urging that the ADA be amended to transform the presently vague
undue hardship standard into one resembling the quantitative model [the author] pro-
pose[s]”); Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62
FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2010) (arguing that reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship are not separate tests).
68. Alex B. Long, The ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Inno-
cent Third Parties”, 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 866 (2003).
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Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are two sides of
the same coin. The statutory duty is accommodation up to the limit
of hardship, and reasonable accommodation should not be a sepa-
rate hurdle for claimants to surmount apart from the undue hardship
defense. There is no such thing as “unreasonable accommodation”
or “due hardship.”69
1. Coverage and Plaintiffs Slipping through the Cracks: Sutton’s
“Catch 22”
From the Act’s inception, and that of its predecessor, the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973,70 courts have tended to construe the notions of
a substantial limitation and of a major life activity narrowly, banishing
countless plaintiffs from the ambit of the act’s protection. Though the
Supreme Court proclaimed in Bragdon v. Abbott71 that the word “ma-
jor” connotes “significance,” and admonished that the statute “ad-
dresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter
inabilities,”72 this did little to stop lower courts from continually find-
ing plaintiffs not to be disabled within the meaning of the act. Moreo-
ver, the Court subsequently limited the act’s coverage, holding that
plaintiffs are to be evaluated in their medicated or remediated state
only, and that a substantially limiting impairment is one that “prevents
or severely restricts” the performance of a major life activity.73 Such
limiting interpretations have compounded the extant tension inherent
in the act itself: demonstrating a substantial limitation and at the same
time demonstrating that the limitation does not render one simply un-
qualified for the position at issue, or, as some scholars have called it,
the “catch-22” that plaintiffs confront as they seek to establish the
requisite ability and disabilities for protection under the Act.74
69. Weber, supra note 67, at 1124. R
70. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). For a comprehensive discussion on the courts’ con-
struction of these terms under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the 1974 Amendments
to the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA, see generally Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of
Disability under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What
Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 98, 126 (2000).
71. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
72. Id. at 638, 641.
73. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), super-
seded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553 (2008).
74. See Jonathan Brown, Defining Disability in 2001: A Lower Court Odyssey, 23
WHITTIER L. REV. 355, 381–85 (2001); Timmons, supra note 27, at 318–19; see also R
EEOC. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 619 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Consider-
ing plaintiffs’ abilities to perform their jobs as evidence weighing against finding that
they are disabled under the ADA would create an impossible catch-22 for plaintiffs: if
their disabilities prevented them from doing their jobs altogether they would not be
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Indeed, under Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the passage
of the ADAAA, a plaintiff who sought to show a substantial limitation
in the major life activity of working might be deemed not “limited
enough” to be considered disabled unless he or she were so limited as
to be virtually incapable of working at all.75 In the same vein, an em-
ployee could be discriminated against for what would be considered a
disabling impairment despite showing no signs of limitation, and then
told that he or she did not qualify as disabled precisely because he or
she showed no sign of limitation.76
Major life activities were traditionally limited to things like those
listed in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regula-
tions, such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”77 How-
ever, courts have been skeptical that one could be substantially limited
in the major life activity of “working” while remaining “otherwise”
qualified for one’s position.78 As a further obstacle, to be considered
qualified individuals for the job under the ADA, and if they were able to work through
their disabilities they would then not be considered disabled.”) (citing Gillen v. Fallon
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 24 (1st Cir. 2002)); Oliva v. Pride Container
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Ms. Oliva falls into this catch-22
situation faced by ADA plaintiffs, i.e. the difficult task of proving that they are suffi-
ciently impaired to be considered disabled yet still able to perform the essential duties
of the job.”); Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U.
L. REV. 1213, 1232 (2003) (“If an individual has a condition that is controlled by
medication or is not extremely severe, the individual is unlikely to be deemed to have
a disability under the courts’ contemporary interpretations. Yet, if a person has a se-
vere condition that is impervious to medication, she may not be considered ‘qualified’
for the job. Thus, the window of opportunity for a plaintiff to be both disabled and
qualified is quite narrow.”); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA
Enforcement System Treat People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L.
REV. 94, 122 (2006) (“There is a certain Catch-22 in the way courts have interpreted
the ADA’s definition of disability, if not in the definition itself—the plaintiff is put to
the task of showing both that an impairment is serious enough to substantially limit a
major life activity and that it is not so serious as to render the individual unable to do
the job.”).
75. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198 (“[T]o be substantially limited in per-
forming manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or se-
verely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to
most people’s daily lives.”).
76. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999) (holding that
although the plaintiffs were impaired, there was no substantial limitation because their
vision was fully corrected by glasses).
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2010).
78. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, superseded by statute, ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“[T]here may be some
conceptual difficulty in defining ‘major life activities’ to include work . . . .”). But cf.
EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The inability to
access the many opportunities afforded by working constitutes exclusion from many
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substantially limited in the major life activity of working, a plaintiff
must show that he or she is not only restricted from working in his or
her own job, but in a broad class of jobs.79
The result of this Supreme Court jurisprudence was to make it
extremely difficult for one who wanted to demonstrate that he or she
was otherwise qualified to perform the job at issue to make the neces-
sary threshold showing that he or she was disabled within the meaning
of the statute.80
2. Adams v. Rice
In one particularly memorable district court case that preceded
the ADAAA, Adams v. Rice,81 the plaintiff, who had been diagnosed
and successfully treated for breast cancer during her application pro-
cess, sought employment as a Foreign Service Officer.82 Having
passed “rigorous written and oral examinations,” ranking seventh out
of two hundred candidates, and despite the fact that her doctor re-
ported that she was “cancer-free,” “[was] able to undertake a full
schedule of work, travel, and vigorous sports, . . . ha[d] no job limita-
tions whatsoever,” and “had been successfully treated for early stage
breast cancer with an excellent prognosis,”83 the plaintiff was told that
she would not be offered the position because “only 53% of all For-
eign Service posts had the professional and technical support required
for her follow-up care.”84 The plaintiff’s request for a waiver of the
of the significant experiences of life. Without doubt, then, working is a major life
activity.”).
79. See, e.g., Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 2002) (“With
respect to working [as a major life activity], the person must be significantly restricted
in the ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs. . . . [W]e will consider the
number and type of jobs from which a person is disqualified, the geographical area to
which the person has reasonable access, and the individual’s job expectations and
training.”); Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 818 (2001) (“[It is] clear that whether an impair-
ment substantially limits the major life activity of working depends primarily on the
availability of jobs for which the impaired person qualifies.”).
80. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Dis-
ability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the
Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539 (1997) (“The restrictions on the
term ‘disability,’ imposed in the name of reserving the protection of the statute for
‘the truly disabled,’ have caught many plaintiffs with serious, highly disabling condi-
tions in their webs.”).
81. 484 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2007), rev’d in part, 531 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 18, 19.
84. Id. at 19.
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worldwide availability requirement imposed upon her was subse-
quently denied.85
The district court adjudged her cancer to be neither long-term86
nor an impairment that still afflicted her87 and therefore held she was
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. As a result, there was no
examination of whether she had been treated in comportment with the
statute.88
This case is illustrative of the many cases pre-dating the ADAAA
in which plaintiffs with clearly disabling conditions, such as cancer
and HIV, were foreclosed from bringing cases that challenged dis-
crimination based undisputedly on their conditions, because they were
not found to be “disabled” within the meaning of the statute and thus
fell through the multiple “cracks” in the statute. Adding insult to in-
jury, the district court in Adams rejected the alternate claim the plain-
tiff was forced to make due to the definition of “disability” in the
ADA: “that plaintiff’s breast cancer treatment, as opposed to the can-
cer itself, is a physical impairment, or that the surgical treatment
caused a mental impairment, and that such impairment limits plaintiff
in the major life activity of sexual contact.”89 The court answered that
there was
no evidence, nor has plaintiff even alleged, that defendant was
aware of any mental impairment of the plaintiff in the period in
which it made the challenged employment decision. Nor is there
any evidence that defendant made its employment decision on the
basis of the surgical treatment plaintiff underwent to treat her can-
cer. Rather, all evidence shows that the decision was based solely
on plaintiff’s need for follow-up care.90
The district court also rejected the plaintiff’s additional argument
that “as long as [the] defendant knew of plaintiff’s breast cancer and
made its decision ‘because of her breast cancer,’ [it] can be held liable
even if it was not aware of how the cancer substantially limited a
major life activity of the plaintiff,”91 noting, without a hint of irony,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 20 (“Plaintiff was quickly treated for her cancer . . . recovered during
several weeks after the surgery, and returned to work one month after surgery.”).
87. Id. at 20–21 (“[The] defendant did not make its revised medical clearance deci-
sion until . . . [the] plaintiff had fully recovered from her cancer. Thus, plaintiff’s
cancer itself was not an impairment by the time the challenged employment actions
subsequently took place and therefore cannot be the grounds for a discrimination
claim.”).
88. Id. at 22.
89. Id. at 21.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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that “this defendant made its employment decision upon information
from plaintiff’s physician that she was cancer-free and had fully re-
covered except for the need for minimal follow-up care. . . .
[P]laintiff’s breast cancer had been fully treated, and plaintiff’s need
for follow-up care alone does not qualify as a disability.”92
Indeed, the district court also explored and rejected the possibil-
ity that the plaintiff was either “regarded as” disabled or had a record
of a disability:
The impairments reflected in this record were of a purely tempo-
rary nature, and thus are not impairments that substantially limit a
major life activity. The recovery times following plaintiff’s sur-
geries consisted only of several weeks, hardly enough to qualify as
a permanent or long-term impairment. Therefore, plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that defendant relied upon a record of an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity, and thus cannot show
that she satisfies the second prong of the Act’s definition of disabil-
ity . . . . In order to be “regarded as” disabled, an employer must
believe that the plaintiff had a substantially limiting physical im-
pairment. If, however, the employer rejects a candidate because
they have an extremely minor medical problem, then the candidate
is clearly not “regarded as” disabled.93
Finally, the district court rejected any argument that the plaintiff
was regarded as limited in the major life activity of working:
Defendant admits that it was plaintiff’s required treatment that pre-
vented her from obtaining employment with the Foreign Service.
Defendant argues, however, that this is not a class of jobs sufficient
to demonstrate that plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited her
in the major life activity of working . . . . [J]obs requiring world-
wide-availability are not a broad class of jobs sufficient to show
that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled. Accordingly, plaintiff
cannot demonstrate that she satisfies the third prong of the Act’s
definition of disability.94
The district court ended its opinion—rife with “catch-22’s”—on
a seemingly apologetic note and a plea that Congress intervene and
amend the ADA:
The Court is not without sympathy for plaintiff’s predicament.
Plaintiff was obviously extremely qualified for a position with the
Foreign Service, and was struck by cancer at perhaps the most in-
opportune time. Moreover, defendant’s refusal to accept the recom-
mendations of plaintiff’s physicians or otherwise accommodate her
92. Id.
93. Id. at 22–23 (internal citations omitted).
94. Id. at 23.
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minor medical needs appears both callous and unreasonable. None-
theless, the Court is bound by the law governing this situation.95
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
versed the grant of summary judgment in light of its holding that a
material issue of disputed fact existed over whether the plaintiff had a
“record of” an impairment that substantially limited her major life ac-
tivity of engaging in sexual relations.96 It nonetheless found that the
district court, applying the relevant law, had correctly found that she
was neither actually disabled within the meaning of the statute,97 nor
was she “regarded as” having a disability,98 nor substantially limited
in her ability to care for herself or to work, despite this small victory
on appeal.99 The absurdity of a plaintiff discriminated against (justly
or unjustly) because of her successfully treated breast cancer, and be-
ing forced to plead her inability to engage in sexual relations—some-
thing that clearly neither her employer nor the court had any legitimate
interest in—in order to claim protection under the statute, showed the
glaring holes and deficiencies in the statute and in the jurisprudence.
3. Felix v. New York City Transit Authority
In Felix v. New York City Transit Authority,100 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that there must be a causal nexus
between the precise major life activity or activities that are substan-
tially limited by a disabling impairment and the objective of the re-
quested reasonable accommodation.101 In that case, a New York City
Transit worker, who sold subway tokens underground, sued her em-
ployer when she was denied her requested accommodation of a trans-
fer to an above-ground job due to post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), which she developed after seeing a subway token booth set
afire. The court, however, observed that plaintiff’s “disability” was the
insomnia caused by her PTSD, which substantially limited her in the
major life activity of sleeping.102 Thus, it reasoned, “an employer dis-
criminates against an employee with a disability only by failing to
95. Id. at 23–24.
96. Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For more discussion of
Adams v. Rice and the impact of the court of appeal’s holding, see Malvina J.
Hryniewicz, The Definition of “Major Life Activity” Under Adams v. Rice is Not
“Substantially Limiting”, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 417 (2010).
97. Adams, 531 F.3d at 944–45.
98. Id. at 945.
99. Id. at 944–45.
100. 324 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
101. Id. at 107; accord Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir.
2003) (holding that a causal connection must exist).
102. Felix, 324 F.3d at 105.
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provide a reasonable accommodation for the ‘disability’ which is the
impairment of the major life activity.”103 Moreover, the court found
the plaintiff
fully able to work, just not in the subway. Her inability to work in
the subway was related to her insomnia because they both stemmed
from the same traumatic incident and resultant psychological disor-
der, the PTSD. But this common traumatic origin alone does not
mean that the non-disability impairment is entitled to an
accommodation.104
Thus, because the plaintiff’s insomnia was “separate from her in-
ability to work in the subway . . . even though both were caused by the
subway firebombing and the resultant PTSD,” and the plaintiff
claimed “that she could not work in the subway because she was ‘ter-
rified of being alone and closed in,’” the court found that “the impair-
ment for which Felix seeks accommodation does not arise ‘because of
the disability.’”105 The court noted that “[i]f the requested accommo-
dation addressed a limitation caused by Felix’s insomnia, it would be
covered by the ADA,” but that “impairments not caused by the disa-
bility need not be accommodated.”106 Therefore, had the plaintiff re-
quested an accommodation that would help her to sleep better, the
court presumably would have found the requisite nexus. However, her
requested accommodation, which would have enabled her to continue
selling tokens for the transit authority while living with her PTSD,
was found inappropriate under the statute.
There are numerous tensions built into the precarious balancing
act of negotiating Congress’ goal of affording access and entre´e into
public life, and specifically employment, for the disabled,107 and the
courts’ admonition that the statute’s mandate is to level, but not tilt,
the playing field for the disabled vis-a`-vis the non-disabled.108
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 105, 107.
106. Id. at 107.
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at
22 (1990) (“The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring per-
sons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life”); id.
at 28 (“The Committee, after extensive review and analysis over a number of Con-
gressional sessions, concludes that there exists a compelling need to establish a clear
and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in
the areas of employment in the private sector, public accommodations, public ser-
vices, transportation, and telecommunications.”).
108. See, e.g., Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We cannot
accept that Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to grant preferential treatment for
disabled workers.”); Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1196
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The contours of the reasonable accommodation mandate have
thus been hazy and have shifted over time, leading some scholars to
argue that the causal nexus doctrine ought to be rejected because it
unduly restricts the duty of providing reasonable accommodation and
permits too many disabled individuals to fall through the cracks of an
act intended to make the workplace accessible to them.109 Moreover,
scholars have argued that because plaintiffs are often exhorted or com-
pelled to choose a qualifying major life activity “strategically”110 as
they navigate the fine line between being insufficiently limited to be
disabled and too limited to be qualified, the imposition of the causal
nexus requirement can be at least debilitating and often fatal to one’s
case.111
(7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Americans with Disabilities Act does not command affirma-
tive action in hiring or firing.”); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th
Cir. 1995) (“[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given
priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled. It prohibits em-
ployment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and
no less.”); see also Timmons, supra note 27, at 315 (“Interpreting the scope of the R
duty of reasonable accommodation too narrowly will thwart Congress’s goal of equal
employment opportunity for individuals with disabilities. On the other hand, courts
have frequently stated that the ADA’s requirement of reasonable accommodation
should result in a level playing field for individuals with disabilities, rather than pro-
viding them an unfair advantage through preferential treatment.”).
109. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is “Because of the Disability” under the
Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the
Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 346-47 (2006) (“[C]ourts
may mistakenly tie the accommodation to the major life activity that is limited rather
than the physical or mental impairment itself; take an unduly narrow view of what
impairment is involved and thus find no causal connection between the disability and
the requested accommodation; or divorce the person’s actions or conduct from the
person’s disability, allowing the employer to refuse to accommodate the conduct.”);
Timmons, supra note 27, at 315 (arguing that the rule set forth in Felix should be R
rejected, but that “the duty of reasonable accommodation should apply only when
there is a substantial conflict between the individual’s disability-related limitation and
the challenged workplace practice or structure”).
110. Jonathan Brown, Defining Disability in 2001: A Lower Court Odyssey, 23
WHITTIER L. REV. 335, 382 (2001); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do
About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. J. 91, 145–46, 161 (2000).
111. See Anderson, supra note 109, at 379–80 (“The ‘because of’ causation cases R
are another practical fallout of a perceived incompatibility between reasonable accom-
modation and a civil rights paradigm built on principles of formal equality.”); Tim-
mons, supra note 27, at 354 (“These barriers—which exist because standard R
workplace policies and structures developed based on a norm of a worker without
physical or mental impairments—often exclude disabled individuals due to disability-
related limitations that are not causally connected to a substantially limited major life
activity.”).
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Both the district court and the court of appeals’ opinions in Felix
have come under fire.112 Specifically, commentators have noted that
in contravention of the ADA’s broad accommodation mandate, the
district court appeared to intimate that “disabled individuals are enti-
tled to reasonable accommodation only if they are substantially lim-
ited in the major life activity of working.”113 Professor Kelly Cahill
Timmons critiqued the Second Circuit’s application of ADA law in
the facts of Felix as follows:
[T]he appellate court decision . . . features questionable reasoning.
The court repeatedly referred to the plaintiff’s disability as insom-
nia. Certainly, if the plaintiff’s disability was insomnia, her inabil-
ity to work in the subway would not be a limitation caused by that
disability, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to her requested
accommodation. Determining a plaintiff’s disability, however, must
begin by identifying a physical or mental impairment . . . . The fact
that insomnia is a short-hand term for a limitation on the major life
activity of sleeping eased the Second Circuit’s task in defining the
plaintiff’s disability as only the limitation on a major life activity,
rather than, as the statute indicates, the “physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits . . . [a] major life activit[y].” Given
that the plaintiff’s impairment, and thus her disability, was PTSD
and not insomnia, does either the text of the ADA or precedent
support the Second Circuit’s holding that the law only entitles the
plaintiff to accommodation for her sleeping difficulties?114
II.
THE AMENDMENTS AND WHAT WAS MISSED
The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA) was enacted on September 25, 2008, and became effective
January 1, 2009.115 Congress enacted the amendments because it
found that the intent behind the original ADA was to provide broad
coverage and to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
112. See Timmons, supra note 27, at 330 (noting that the Felix nexus requirement R
made no sense, especially in light of the fact that “[w]hen an employer intentionally
discriminates against an individual with an actual disability because of that disability,
courts do not require the plaintiff to prove that the employer was motivated by—or
even knew about—the plaintiff’s substantially limited major life activity,” and a de-
parture from this thinking in the case of a requested accommodation is senseless).
113. Id. at 326 (citing Felix v. N.Y.C.  Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661, 662
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
114. Id. at 328–29.
115. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102–12213 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
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ties.”116 Congress found that although it had “expected that the defini-
tion of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently
with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation ha[d] not been
fulfilled” due to Supreme Court and other jurisprudence and adminis-
trative regulations that unduly constricted the scope of the ADA’s
protection.117
Congress thus explicitly declared its purpose in enacting the
amendments to be the reinstatement of a broad scope of coverage
under the act, as well as the concomitant rejection of the holdings in
cases like Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.118 and Toyota Motor Manu-
facturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams;119 and the resurrection of the
thinking in cases like School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,120
which had articulated a broad construction of the definition of a handi-
cap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.121
A. While the Amendments Effected a Good Deal of Reform
Regarding Coverage, They Left Issues Surrounding the
Reasonable Accommodation Analysis
Virtually Untouched
1. The Amendments Drastically Extended the Act’s Coverage
The amendments dramatically expanded coverage under the act
by doing several things. First, they increased the number and variety
of major life activities, the substantial limitation of which would qual-
ify a plaintiff as disabled within the meaning of the act. Substantively,
a disability is still defined as “a physical or mental impairment that
116. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a)(1).
117. Id. § 2(a)(3).
118. 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that impairments must be evaluated in their
mitigated state in determining if an individual has a disability for purposes of the
ADA).
119. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (holding that “disability” definition is to be strictly
construed); see also Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the
Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L.
REV. 311, 320 (2009) (noting that the ADAAA addressed judicial interpretations of
the ADA); Weber, supra note 67, at 1164 (citing Alex B. Long, Introducing the New R
and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of
2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2008)).
120. 480 U.S. 273, 284–85 (1987) (construing 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
121. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(3) (“The purpose[ ] of this Act [is] . . . to
reject the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability and
to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the
definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”).
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substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individ-
ual; . . . a record of such an impairment; or . . . being regarded as
having such an impairment.”122 However, following a list of major life
activities including “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, see-
ing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, com-
municating, and working,” the amendments added the proviso that “a
major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily func-
tion, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system,
normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, re-
spiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”123
Notably, the amendments mandated that the definition of the
term disability “be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals
under th[e] Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of th[e]
Act.”124 In addition, they amended the operative coverage principles
to specify that plaintiffs being assessed for a disability would be eval-
uated in their unmitigated, rather than in their mitigated states. Setting
its sights on Sutton, Congress drafted the amendments to state that
when determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning
of the act, no weight or regard is to be given to
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as—(I) medi-
cation, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision de-
vices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses),
prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear
implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or
oxygen therapy equipment and supplies; (II) use of assistive tech-
nology; (III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or ser-
vices; or (IV) learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications.125
Significantly, however, “ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses,”
the mitigating measures at issue in Sutton, were expressly excepted
from this mandate.126 Nonetheless, the ADAAA removes the essential
“catch-22” predicament in which Sutton had placed so many plain-
tiffs. Specifically, suits by plaintiffs who can prove that they are being
122. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(1).
123. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B).
124. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A); accord Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Im-
proved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court had
established demanding standards under the ADA, and how the amendments elimi-
nated those demanding standards).
125. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i).
126. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(E)(i)(I).
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discriminated against because of their impairments are no longer pre-
cluded simply because their impairments are successfully treated by
mitigating measures. By declaring that “[a]n impairment that is epi-
sodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a
major life activity when active,”127 the amendments put a stop to cases
in which the technical fact that a non-minor, non-temporary impair-
ment is not actively impeding a plaintiff’s functioning at a given mo-
ment precludes that plaintiff from being adjudged disabled, even
where the impairment is stigmatized, engendering the very discrimina-
tion of which the plaintiff complains.
Additionally, the amendments explicitly rejected the restrictive
interpretation that the Supreme Court in its jurisprudence and the
EEOC in the promulgation of its regulations had accorded the term
“substantially limits,” noting that the restrictive interpretation was in-
consistent with congressional intent.128 Further, the amendments di-
rected the EEOC to revise its regulations so that the term
“substantially limited” would no longer be defined as “significantly
restricted,” which was not in agreement with congressional intent.129
Perhaps most significantly, the ADAAA essentially dropped the
de facto requirement that an ADA plaintiff actually be substantially
limited in a major life activity by revisiting and reforming the defini-
tion of one who is “regarded as” disabled.130 The amendments pro-
vided that a plaintiff is properly adjudged to be “regarded as” disabled
whenever she shows that a prohibited action has occurred due to a real
or perceived non-transitory, non-minor physical or mental impair-
ment, irrespective of whether the impairment limited or was perceived
as limiting a major life activity.131 This represented a drastic change
127. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(D).
128. Id. § 2(a)(7)–(8).
129. Id. § 2(b)(6) (“[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise
that portion of its current regulations that defines the term ‘substantially limits’ as
‘significantly restricted’ to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments
made by this Act.”).
130. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A); see also Cox, supra note 25, at 203 (explaining why the R
effects or perceived effects of an impairment are no longer relevant to whether a
plaintiff is part of the ADA’s protected class).
131. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A) (“An individual meets the
requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual estab-
lishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because
of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impair-
ment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”); see also Cox, supra note
25, at 202–03 (“The ADAAA [amends] the ADA’s ‘regarded as’ provision, which R
was originally designed to permit plaintiffs to establish membership in the ADA’s
protected class based on their employer’s perception—whether accurate or not—that
they had a disability.”).
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from courts’ previous interpretations of the ADA and their conclusion
that a plaintiff not perceived as actually being substantially limited in
at least one major life activity was precluded from being deemed “re-
garded as” disabled.132 Prior to the enactment of the amendments,
courts had construed the act to deny coverage to plaintiffs who were
clearly being discriminated against because of their impairment, for
the simple and highly illogical reason that they could not show con-
temporaneous, actual, or perceived substantial interference with a ma-
jor life activity.133 Hence, they were not “disabled,” and no
discrimination against them could violate the ADA. Under the amend-
ments, any non-minor impairment, so long as it has an actual or pro-
jected duration of more than six months, that is shown to have
engendered discrimination, will bring a plaintiff within the statute’s
protection.134
The amendments’ changes to the ADA’s “regarded as” prong,135
and their call for a more expansive reading of the definition of “disa-
bility,”136 will surely aid numerous plaintiffs who, while irrefutably
demonstrated to be victims of discrimination based on their impair-
ments, do not actually manifest the requisite impediment—the sub-
stantial interference with a major life activity.137 Once a plaintiff is
132. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
133. See Cox, supra note 25, at 201 (citing Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million R
Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (“As a result of
these restrictive interpretations of the ADA’s protected class, a 2007 study suggested
that federal courts had effectively limited the ADA’s protected class to a category of
persons that would have extreme difficulty demonstrating that they are qualified to
work, even with the provision of ADA accommodations.”)).
134. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B) (“A transitory impairment
is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”); see also
Cox, supra note 25, at 202 (“While the original ADA required all plaintiffs to demon- R
strate a substantial limitation of a major life activity, the ADAAA provides that when
a plaintiff is not requesting a reasonable accommodation, she must prove only that she
experienced discrimination due to a physical or mental impairment (whether actual or
perceived) that is not ‘transitory and minor.’”).
135. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
136. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(1) (“As used in this Act: (1) Disability—The term ‘disability’
means, with respect to an individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as de-
scribed in paragraph (3)).”).
137. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i) (“The determination of whether an impairment sub-
stantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures”); see also Cox, supra note 25, at 202–03  (“Whether R
‘the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity’ is no longer rele-
vant to whether a plaintiff alleging discrimination . . . qualifies for membership in the
ADA’s protected class.”); Long, supra note 124, at 224 (“[A]n ADA plaintiff no R
longer faces the difficult task of proving that a defendant’s misperception of his or her
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adjudged to be disabled or regarded as disabled, courts will be able
(forced, in fact) to proceed to the rest of an ADA analysis. That is, the
court must now proceed to evaluate whether anything, such as a safety
rationale or a public policy or third party interest,138 justified or other-
wise excused the discrimination. Barring such a finding, the plaintiff
will now win her case, irrespective of whether there is any relationship
between the major life activity she named to attain coverage and the
actual discrimination itself. A plaintiff seeking to be adjudged actually
(as opposed to regarded as or having a record of being) “disabled”
must only show substantial interference with at least one major life
activity, and the amendments are explicit that “[an] impairment that
substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major
life activities in order to be considered a disability.”139 Having shown
the requisite interference with one major life activity, the plaintiff is
ushered under the umbrella of the ADA’s coverage, and discrimina-
tion targeted at her because of her impairment—not because of her
execution of any major life activity—will be actionable under the
ADA.140
2. The Amendments Did Almost Nothing to Revise or Clarify the
Reasonable Accommodation Analysis
While under the amendments more plaintiffs than ever before
will qualify as disabled and be able to maintain cases that allege a
failure to accommodate, the amendments have done virtually nothing
to revise or otherwise clarify the reasonable accommodation analysis
that has confused, divided, and stymied courts.141 Due to courts’ pre-
condition was so severe as to amount to a belief that the condition substantially lim-
ited a major life activity.”).
138. See generally Long, supra note 68 (addressing a method of dealing with ac- R
commodation issues, focusing on the effect that the accommodation would have on
other employees and third parties).
139. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(C); accord Long, supra note
124, at 222 (noting that the Amendments make several changes to the concept of R
major life activities including “clarif[ying] what has always been implicit” and “re-
ject[ing] the Supreme Court’s ‘demanding standard’”).
140. See Cox, supra note 25, at 202–03 (“Whether ‘the impairment limits or is per- R
ceived to limit a major life activity’ is no longer relevant to whether a plaintiff alleg-
ing discrimination (other than the denial of a reasonable accommodation) qualifies for
membership in the ADA’s protected class.”).
141. See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination,
83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 540 (2008) (“[B]y including greater numbers of individuals in
the protected class, the [AD]AAA will likely focus more attention on whether accom-
modations impose an undue hardship on an employer.”); cf. Michelle A. Travis, Lash-
ing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits
Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 320 (2009) (“In fact, if the
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ADAAA tendency to dispose of cases because a plaintiff did not meet
the statute’s definition of “disabled,” the reasonable accommodation
analysis has been performed relatively infrequently and not uniformly.
The only alteration that the ADAAA makes to the reasonable ac-
commodation analysis is to indicate that one who is merely “regarded
as” disabled, rather than one who is actually “disabled” within the
meaning of the statute, is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation.
Prior to the enactment of the ADAAA, some courts had taken the stat-
ute’s words literally and held that plaintiffs who did not have any sub-
stantially limiting impairment, but who were “regarded as” having one
and were therefore “regarded as” being disabled were entitled to a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.142 The ADAAA thus
amended the “regarded as” prong of the statute in an attempt to re-
verse the effects of those decisions. To the extent that Congress was
moved by the commonsense notion that one ought not merit an ac-
commodation that one does not actually require, this revision clearly
has some surface appeal. However, someone who actually does re-
quire an accommodation in order to successfully perform her job and
who is properly viewed as disabled, but cannot meet the requirement
of demonstrating substantial interference with a major life activity,
will now, under current law, be denied that accommodation.143
Moreover, because the amendments made no other attempt to al-
ter the reasonable accommodation analysis, the problems seen under
the previous regime are likely to persist.144 Under the amendments, a
plaintiff who can only show that he was “regarded as” disabled and
who alleges discrimination need only show: (1) the fact of the (non-
temporary, non-minor) impairment;145 and (2) a causal nexus between
ADAAA succeeds in its primary objective of shifting litigation focus away from scru-
tinizing whether an individual is or is not disabled, and toward the issue of whether
employers have fulfilled their reasonable accommodation obligations, the ADAAA
actually may reinvigorate the backlash as the accommodation mandate becomes more
visible and more contested.”).
142. See, e.g., Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
143. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(A); see also Long, supra
note 124, at 225 (discussing the change). R
144. See Travis, supra note 141, at 320 (“In fact, if the ADAAA succeeds in its R
primary objective of shifting litigation focus away from scrutinizing whether an indi-
vidual is or is not disabled, and toward the issue of whether employers have fulfilled
their reasonable accommodation obligations, the ADAAA actually may reinvigorate
the backlash as the accommodation mandate becomes more visible and more
contested.”).
145. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B) (“A transitory impair-
ment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of [six] months or less.”).
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the impairment and discrimination forbidden by the statute.146 That is
all. However, even after the enactment of the amendments, the “Felix
problem” persists when it comes to cases that allege a failure to ac-
commodate. On the one hand, if a plaintiff deemed covered by the
statute has alleged discrimination whereby her terms and conditions of
employment have been altered because of her disability or the percep-
tion of her disability—if, for example, she is demoted or fired—her
case has been made. On the other hand, because pursuant to the
amendments, reasonable accommodations need not be provided by
employers to those merely “regarded as” disabled, only through a
demonstration that one or more major life activities were substantially
interfered with will one merit a reasonable accommodation.147 Thus,
ADA plaintiffs seeking a reasonable accommodation, even post-
amendments, will still face the “Felix problem.” Courts will parse out
a plaintiff’s disabilities to determine whether or not the reasonable
accommodation requested specifically furthers a major life activity put
at issue by the disability claim.148
3. Clarification Regarding the Reasonable Accommodation
Analysis is More Important Now than Ever
Clarifying the reasonable accommodation analysis is more im-
portant in the wake of the ADAAA’s passage than it ever was before.
The persistence of unresolved issues from the previous regime, com-
pounded with certain changes effected by the amendments, make rea-
sonable accommodation a topic that warrants further attention.
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qual-
ified individual on the basis of  disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job train-
ing, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”).
147. The ADAAA provided that employers “need not provide a reasonable accom-
modation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to an indi-
vidual who meets” the “regarded as” definition. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec.
6(a)(1), § 501(h); see also Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability
Backlash, and the ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1289 (2009) (not-
ing that “the third prong of the definition of disability was modified to eliminate the
substantial limitation requirement,” but that “[i]ndividuals asserting disability under
that prong . . . will not be entitled to reasonable accommodations”); Long, supra note
124, at 225 (noting that prior to the amendments, courts were divided on whether a R
plaintiff “regarded as” disabled could receive accommodations, and that the ADAAA
took “the side of the defendants in this instance”).
148. See Long, supra note 124, at 229 (“The amendments leave a host of reasonable R
accommodation issues unresolved, such as whether an employer must, as part of its
duty of reasonable accommodation, reassign an individual with a disability to a vacant
position when there is another, more qualified applicant and whether there should be a
presumption that allowing an employee to work from home is not a reasonable
accommodation.”).
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First, increased coverage under the statute means that more cases
will now survive the argument that the plaintiff is not “disabled”
within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, more cases will actually
proceed to the analysis of whether a proposed accommodation is, in
fact, a reasonable accommodation or whether it confers an undue
hardship upon the employer. In addition, under the “causal nexus”
doctrine promulgated in several circuits, numerous plaintiffs whose
disabilities are covered by the ADA may be denied accommodations
that they truly need in order to work, because they cannot link their
need for an accommodation, which pertains directly to the way in
which their impairment affects their ability to work, with the major
life activity that is substantially limited. Moreover, it will not be possi-
ble for plaintiffs to get reasonable accommodations when they fall
through the cracks because they are merely “regarded as” disabled,
despite the fact that they endure disability discrimination based upon a
real or perceived disability and are unable to perform their jobs with-
out reasonable accommodation.
Because of the skepticism with which the major life activity of
“working” is viewed by courts and litigants alike,149 the idea that a
reasonable accommodation will aid the plaintiff in the major life activ-
ity of working, as most accommodations ultimately do, becomes irrel-
evant. As scholars have pointed out, the ADA’s language “does not
state that, to be accommodated, limitations must be causally connected
to the plaintiff’s substantially limited major life activity.”150 Despite
this contention—premised on this plain language, legislative history
149. See, e.g., Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999) (requiring that in order to
have working be considered a major life activity, the individual establish that she was
regarded as unable to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs when
compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities);
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999) (concluding that plaintiffs
were not substantially limited in the major life activity of working because their visual
impairment only precluded them from holding the single job of global airline pilot);
Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2007) (declining to find
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working where the plaintiff failed to
“submit[ ] [any] evidence of the range of jobs available in her geographic area that
would fall within her physical restrictions”); see also James M. Carroll, The Causal
Nexus Doctrine: A Further Limitation on the Employer’s ADA Duty of Reasonable
Accommodation in the Seventh Circuit, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 839, 849 (2008) (observing
that “the [Sutton] Court’s skeptical remarks regarding working as a major life activity
show the Court construing the ADA more narrowly in Sutton than it had in Brag-
don.”); Long, supra note 124, at 226 (“As a result of this rule, ADA plaintiffs have R
had great difficulty establishing that they were actually disabled when working was
the major life activity in question.”); Timmons, supra note 27, at 318 (“Claims based R
on the major life activity of working also rarely succeed, due to the difficulty of
proving inability to work in a broad class of jobs.”).
150. Timmons, supra note 27, at 330. R
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and intent, and other provisions within the statute that, contrary to the
holding in Felix, “the duty of reasonable accommodation applies to an
individual’s impairment, provided that the impairment satisfies the
definition of disability, not to an individual’s substantially limited ma-
jor life activity,”151—the amendments have done nothing to correct
the Felix “causal nexus” doctrine.
Finally, as discussed previously, courts and scholars alike disa-
gree as to precisely how the reasonable accommodation analysis ought
to be done and how burdens should be conceptualized and assigned in
its adjudication. This disagreement signals that the issue of how to
execute the reasonable accommodation analysis warrants immediate
and close attention.152 The remainder of this paper suggests how the
reasonable accommodation analysis might be best revisited, altered,
and clarified in light of this pressing need, and in addition suggests
how the statute as a whole might benefit from some additional
overhaul.
III.
PROPOSALS
A. The Requirement that a Plaintiff Alleging a Failure to
Accommodate Demonstrate that She is Substantially
Limited in One or More Major Life Activities
Should be Removed
Although at first it might appear to be a bold and drastic move,
the purposes of the ADA would be best served if plaintiffs alleging an
employer’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation did not
have to demonstrate any substantial limitation of a major life activity.
There are several reasons for this.
The ADAAA effectively removed the “major life activity” bar-
rier to coverage under the act for those plaintiffs who experience an
affirmative act of discrimination.153 Although the act retained its cen-
151. Id.
152. See Michael Ashley Stein et. al., Cause Lawyering for People With Disabilities,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1700 (2010) (reviewing SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009)) (“The moment
is ripe for disability cause lawyers to identify a plaintiff with an unquestionable disa-
bility (say a blind individual) who sought a fairly uncontroversial accommodation
(say, a screen magnifier) whose cost would not satisfy the criteria for an undue hard-
ship defense under the ADA.”).
153. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i) (“The determination
of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made with-
out regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures”); see also Cox, supra
note 25, at 203 (“Whether ‘the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\14-2\NYL210.txt unknown Seq: 33 19-APR-11 14:14
2011] SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS 541
tral definition of a disability as a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, the amendments did several
things that obviated the need for the plaintiff to demonstrate a nexus
between the major life activity and the discrimination alleged. The
amendments even ensured that a plaintiff alleging discrimination who
could not show any interference with a major life activity could still
warrant coverage under the right circumstances. Specifically, in addi-
tion to broadening the definition of “major life activity,” the ADAAA
allows an individual with an impairment in remission or whose major
life activity interference occurs only sporadically to be considered dis-
abled even when the interference is not active.154 The amendments
prohibited courts from considering any mitigating measures other than
“ordinary eye glasses or contact lenses” when deciding whether or not
an impairment is “substantially limiting.” Thus, even if one had no
interference with a major life activity at the time of the discrimination,
one could nonetheless establish that the discrimination was due to the
overall presence of the impairment without linking it to a major life
activity in any way. No nexus needs to be shown. Moreover, the
ADAAA instructed the EEOC to revisit its regulations to define “sub-
stantially limits” broadly, in comportment with the act’s objectives.155
Most significantly, however, the ADAAA expanded the defini-
tion of the term “regarded as” disabled.156 Post-amendments, an indi-
vidual may be properly deemed “regarded as” having an impairment
despite the fact that her employer does not perceive that she is sub-
stantially limited in one or more major life activities. She is “regarded
as” disabled so long as the impairment is non-minor and non-transi-
tory and she “establishes that . . . she has been subjected to an action
prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment.”157 In other words, merely having an actual or
perceived impairment causing the prohibited discrimination is enough
activity’ is no longer relevant to whether a plaintiff alleging discrimination (other than
the denial of a reasonable accommodation) qualifies for membership in the ADA’s
protected class.”).
154. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(D) (“An impairment that is
episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life
activity when active.”).
155. Id. § 2(b)(6) (“The purposes of this Act are . . . to express Congress’ expecta-
tion that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise that portion of
its current regulations that defines the term ‘substantially limits’ as ‘significantly re-
stricted’ to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.”).
156. Id. sec. 4(a), §3(3); see also Long, supra note 124, at 223–24 (detailing the R
expansion of the definition).
157. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(3).
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to extend coverage to a plaintiff. Whether a major life activity is im-
peded need not even enter into the coverage equation.158
However, the analysis is different if a plaintiff alleges a failure to
accommodate. The ADAAA’s only revision to the reasonable accom-
modation mandate was that a plaintiff who is merely regarded as dis-
abled is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation.159 The surface
appeal of such a denial is clear; to the extent that one’s disability cre-
ates no limitations requiring accommodation, no duty to accommodate
need be engendered based upon a mere (mis)perception. On the other
hand, where a non-minor, non-transitory impairment prevents an indi-
vidual from working at the job that she has or desires, the employer’s
duty to accommodate pursuant to the statute will not take hold if she is
merely regarded as disabled; she must show substantial interference
with a major life activity.160
The major life activity interference requirement for individuals
who seek reasonable accommodations under the act is unwarranted.161
This is not to say that a threshold demonstration ought not be required
of those seeking coverage under the act for the purpose of procuring
an accommodation. However, if one has an impairment that is non-
minor, non-transitory, and which thus renders one covered under the
act for the purpose of insulating one from workplace discrimination
that stems from the disability or the perception of the disability, that
individual ought to be considered within the ambit of the statute’s pro-
tection. Such a plaintiff should be seen as one deemed by Congress as
likely to be denied access and entre´e to aspects of public life, includ-
158. See id.; Cox, supra note 25, at 202–03; see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, R
at 16 (2008) (“[T]he emphasis in questions of disability discrimination [should be] on
the critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has been discriminated against on the
basis of disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question of whether a
particular person is even a ‘person with a disability’ with any protections under the
Act at all.”).
159. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 6(a)(1), § 501(h); see also Long, supra
note 124, at 225 (“The ADAAA takes the side of defendants in this instance. The Act R
provides that employers and other covered entities ‘need not provide a reasonable
accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to
an individual who meets’ the ‘regarded as’ definition.”).
160. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 6(a)(1), § 501(h) (“A covered entity
under title I . . . need not provide a reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modifi-
cation to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual who meets the definition of
disability in section 3(1) solely under subparagraph (C) [being regarded as having
such an impairment] of such section.”).
161. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommoda-
tion, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) (looking
to debunk the idea that there is a major difference between the accommodation and
the antidiscrimination requirement of the ADA, stating that accommodation seeks to
serve the same fundamental interests as the antidiscrimination requirements).
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ing gainful employment, due to societal stigmatization, prejudice, and
intolerance. That plaintiff ought to be entitled to a reasonable accom-
modation that would allow her to satisfactorily perform her job.
The reason for this is simple. Employees do not necessarily re-
quire workplace accommodations in order to enable them to perform
major life activities. Take, for example, a blind attorney who requires
voice-activated software in order to draft memoranda. His major life
activity of sight is substantially interfered with by his impairment, but
no accommodation will enhance or enable his sight. The voice-acti-
vated software will enable him to exhibit an essential and valued abil-
ity—the ability to draft memoranda that a judge can read. Disabled
employees require accommodations in order to exhibit essential and
valued abilities. The only purpose the major life activity element of
the reasonable accommodation analysis served was to help designate
who was entitled to coverage under the statute; it served a gate-keep-
ing function. However, with the abolition of the major life activity
requirement for plaintiffs alleging affirmative discrimination, it seems
as though there are better ways of screening plaintiffs to determine
who can obtain relief under the statute.
1. Rationales for Dropping the Major Life Activity Requirement
for Coverage under the ADA
a. The Requirement has Already Been Abandoned under the
ADA’s Anti-Discrimination Mandate
One of the best reasons for dropping the major life activity re-
quirement for coverage under the ADA is that in effect, it has already
been abandoned for plaintiffs who allege affirmative discrimination
under the statute.162 In light of the revisions to what it means to be
“regarded as” disabled, any employee with a non-minor, non-tempo-
rary impairment who suffers discrimination based on that impairment,
whether from the way it is perceived or from the toll it actually takes,
is covered under the statute. Although she may or may not ultimately
succeed, a plaintiff who is discriminated against on the basis of her
being “regarded as” disabled is thus entitled to an analysis as to
whether the discrimination violates the statute or is somehow justified,
because, for example, the plaintiff poses a threat to the safety of
others, or some other viable defense is set forth by the employer. The
162. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A) (“An individual meets
the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act
because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”).
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reasoning for this is clear: those who suffer from non-minor, non-tem-
porary impairments, whether or not such impairments actually affect
any “major life activities,” are members of a protected class of indi-
viduals who have historically and systematically been denied access
and opportunity in the workplace and elsewhere.163 Thus, under the
ADAAA any unlawful discrimination that a member of this group ex-
periences is actionable, irrespective of the individual’s actual specific
impairments or her specific ability to perform any number of major
life activities. To the extent that an individual with a non-minor, non-
temporary impairment also has the inability to, for example,
reproduce, it likely has no bearing on the discrimination or stigmatiza-
tion that she faces on the job.164 Congress, for its part, apparently sees
no further use in imposing a requirement upon this person that she
plead and establish her inability to reproduce or any particular limita-
tion to merit the ADA’s protection.
This should also be the case with those alleging an employer’s
failure to accommodate.165 Anyone with a non-minor, non-temporary
impairment remains identifiable as an individual that Congress has de-
cided is vulnerable to discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere.
Such discrimination may take the form of an unlawful firing. It may
also take the form of a refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation
that will permit that individual to commence or continue working for
that particular employer. Insofar as one who is deemed a member of a
protected class, arguably subject to discrimination and the multitude
of barriers that it erects, is barred from his or her employment by a
refusal to furnish a reasonable accommodation, that individual is de-
nied access, entre´e, and inclusion to the same extent as one whose
impairment causes him or her to be denied a promotion or fired.
163. See id. § 2(a)(2) (“[I]n enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical
and mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all
aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently
precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to
remove societal and institutional barriers.”).
164. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B) (“[A] major life activity also includes the operation
of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”).
165. See generally Timothy J. McFarlin, Comment, If They Ask for A Stool . . .
Recognizing Reasonable Accommodation for Employees “Regarded As” Disabled, 49
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 927 (2005) (arguing that courts should hold employers liable for
failing to reasonably accommodate “regarded as” disabled employees).
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b. There is no Basis for Requiring the Articulation of
Substantial Interference with a Major Life Activity
under the ADA’s Reasonable Accommodation
Entitlement, Nor under its Anti-Discrimination
Mandate
However, a question arises: Isn’t there a difference between re-
quiring an employer to refrain from affirmative discrimination and re-
quiring it to actively cede resources, such as time, money, or other
assistance, toward accommodations? Moreover, didn’t the major life
activity limitation requirement afford the ADA an effective screen
through which floodgates could be regulated?
The fact is, however, that a higher barrier in the form of a major
life activity limitation requirement is not needed in the case of a fail-
ure to accommodate claim.166 To the extent that the dual mandates of
the ADA—that employers refrain from discrimination and that they
afford reasonable accommodations to those deemed disabled—are dis-
tinct, when it comes to requiring that a major life activity interference
be shown, it is a distinction without a difference. One might argue that
that there is a difference between the two, warranting different cover-
age requirements because the anti-discrimination mandate protects the
disabled from irrational discrimination and that the reasonable accom-
modation requirement protects them from rational discrimination. One
might similarly argue that there are no costs to forcing employers to
refrain from discriminating against the disabled in hiring, retaining,
and promoting employees, while furnishing reasonable accommoda-
tions comes at a cost that warrants a greater barrier to coverage. But
this is simply not the case.
Hiring, retaining, and promoting the disabled, even without af-
fording any special accommodations, is not without its costs. Costs are
exacted through increased efforts that it may take to train or employ a
disabled person that may not amount to an accommodation (or at least
one that the employer will not contest). Costs also arise in the form of
externalities like customer preference for non-disabled workers and
co-worker discrimination, both of which may erode corporate re-
sources, goodwill, and productivity. Moreover, even though a disabled
person may be able to perform her job duties with no specified accom-
modation, that person may not be able to “train up” in the same man-
ner as a non-disabled person, such that the training invested in him
166. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 161 (arguing that the costs associated with R
reasonable accommodations cannot be meaningfully distinguished from those im-
posed by antidiscrimination requirements).
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generates optimal efficiency and benefits as he moves up the ranks of
employment. These reasons notwithstanding, the ADA mandates that
because of the societal value of the inclusion of the disabled in public
life, including employment, these costs must be borne so that disabled
workers may both find and keep jobs.167
This is also the case when accommodating disabled workers who
have already found employment. Once employed, the ADA mandates
that workers with disabilities be afforded reasonable accommodations
for the same reason and in furtherance of the same purpose that under-
lies the statute’s anti-discrimination mandate: employers are being
asked to pay costs and to take measures in amounts and in ways
deemed reasonable so that both irrational and rational prejudice are
combated and the disabled are permitted not only to function, but to
remain and thrive in the workplace.
The fact is that those who need reasonable accommodations to
obtain or retain employment come from the same population of people
as those who need the protection of the anti-discrimination mandate.
They are people with non-minor, non-temporary impairments who
face a variety of impediments in their goal of holding down gainful
employment. These impediments may include, but are not limited to,
others’ perception of them or their abilities, actual limitations that may
not be “major life activities” but nonetheless impair their abilities to
do the jobs they have or desire, and actual limitations on major life
activities. Whatever the limitations, these are all people from a group
that has been identified by Congress as vulnerable to bias (rational or
not), exclusion from opportunity, and denial of entre´e into various
veins of public life, employment not the least among them. Merely
pointing to a major life activity—something “that the average person
in the general population can perform”168—and saying it is substan-
tially limited should not be talismanic. It ought not automatically des-
ignate one as warranting protection under the statute. The concerns
that Congress expressed about those whom it intended to protect with
the legislation do not correlate with such a mechanistic determination.
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2006) (setting forth findings including a long history
of unjustified discrimination and the value of including the disabled in public life).
168. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2010) (stating that “substantially limits” means
“[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general popu-
lation can perform”).
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c. It is Not Necessarily Absurd to Mandate the Reasonable
Accommodation of Those Deemed Merely “Regarded
As” Disabled Where the Accommodation is
Truly Needed Because of a Non-Minor,
Non-Transitory Impairment
It should be reiterated here that the anti-discrimination mandate
of the statute now protects those without a limitation on a major life
activity, but who are still “regarded as” disabled. Entitling such indi-
viduals to a reasonable accommodation may seem problematic in that
technically, the accommodation is being afforded to someone who is
merely perceived to have a disability, but is not actually disabled. This
is, however, merely a problem of semantics. To the extent that the
protections of the anti-discrimination mandate of the statute fully ap-
ply to one who has a non-minor, non-temporary impairment, it does
not matter how that person is classified under the statute. The rationale
for affording that person an accommodation is no less compelling than
the rationale for ensuring that one who is perceived as being a member
of the disabled community, although she is not limited in the perform-
ance of a major life activity, does not suffer adverse actions that im-
pact employment.
Labeling a person “regarded as” disabled does little to explain
why the person would not warrant the full protection of the statute; it
merely serves to make affording an accommodation to that person ap-
pear futile or even absurd. The fact remains, however, that the person
is the same irrespective of whether she comes to court seeking a dis-
crimination-free workplace or a reasonable accommodation. She has
been afflicted with an impairment that is more than minor and pro-
jected to be long-term. Even without a discernible major life activity
limitation, the person may very well need a reasonable accommoda-
tion to become or remain employed in a job that would make sense for
him or her. In any event, the person will require, and is entitled to, an
environment free of discrimination.
Mandating that an accommodation be afforded to one who does
not need one is pointless indeed, but entitling one who needs an ac-
commodation to that accommodation even if she is deemed “regarded
as” disabled is not. It is simply a matter of seeing through nomencla-
ture to afford the same group of people everything that the statute
promises, because they are the group that warrants its protections.
Congress has already recognized that those who would be deemed dis-
abled but for their lack of a major life activity limitation would, with-
out the statute’s coverage, surely be discriminated against in
contravention of the statute’s goal of affording access. Congress must
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also realize that this same group of people will be denied relatively
simple accommodations where it is reasonable, based upon the skills
and qualifications of the individual, the nature of what is requested,
and the specifics of the employer’s resources and circumstances, to
grant them the accommodation. In either case, a qualified individual
will not be able to obtain or retain a job that will enable him or her to
earn a living and to participate in public life.
d. The Major Life Activity Requirement is not Necessary to
Ensure Adequate Screening of Meritorious Cases
Meant to be Reached by the Statute
Although the major life activity limitation requirement may be
trumpeted as serving a screening function, the core of the reasonable
accommodation query—which is also capable of serving a screening
function—is the relevant tripartite otherwise qualified/reasonable ac-
commodation/undue hardship analysis.169 Irrespective of whether or
not an individual has a major life activity limitation that may or may
not correlate to a needed accommodation, one will only be entitled to
a requested accommodation to the extent that: (1) the individual is
otherwise qualified for the position; (2) the accommodation is reason-
able; and (3) the accommodation does not impose an undue hardship
on the employer.170 A plaintiff bringing a lawsuit under the ADA is
not entitled to her preferred accommodation; she is only entitled to an
accommodation adjudged reasonable.171 Insofar as the relevant analy-
sis is strengthened and attuned to ensuring that employers retain their
core prerogative to hire the most talented employees, this analysis
alone, without the major life activity analysis, will serve as an effec-
169. For articles relating to the relationship between “undue hardship” and “reasona-
ble accommodation,” see, for example, Anderson, supra note 109; Seth D. Harris, Re- R
Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the
Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123 (2003); James
Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has
Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2005); John E.
Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, What is Reasonable Accommodations Under
the ADA? Not an Easy Answer; Rather a Plethora of Questions, 28 MISS. C. L. REV.
67 (2009); Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of
Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917 (2006); Weber, supra note 67. R
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (Discrimination includes “not making rea-
sonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity”) (emphasis added).
171. See, e.g., EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 471 (5th Cir. 2009);
Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 344 F. App’x 104, 112–13 (6th Cir. 2009).
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tive screen for cases that should not succeed. This is the second major
part of what this Article proposes.
e. The Best Reason of All: There is Simply no Wholesale
Connection between Substantial Interference with
One’s Major Life Activities and Either the
Discrimination that One Faces Due to
One’s Impairment, or One’s Proposed Reasonable
Accommodation
The main rationale for dropping the major life activity require-
ment from the statute’s imposition of the duty to accommodate, and
for dropping it from the statute itself, is that the inability to perform a
commonly performed, “basic” activity like digestion or reproduction
has no significant connection to either the discrimination that employ-
ees face in the workplace or to the nature of the accommodations that
they require in order to perform their jobs. There are those who are
blind, and whose prospective employers would rather not hire them
and take on the obligation of accommodating them in the office pre-
cisely because they cannot see, but there are also those with AIDS,
whose stigmatization has little to nothing to do with the fact that they
cannot, say, reproduce with ease. There are those who need extra time
to complete tasks because they are substantially limited in the major
life activity of walking, and thus slower to get around the workplace,
but there are also individuals like Denise Felix who suffer from a syn-
drome like PTSD that may impair major life activities that are not
traditionally done on paid work time,172 like eating and sleeping, but
who may only require a de minimus expenditure of resources, like an
above-ground transfer (to the extent that one is available) in order to
retain their jobs.
When all is said and done, any reasonable workplace accommo-
dation is actually needed and granted in furtherance of the same ulti-
mate purpose: to get or keep an employee in a position that she holds
or desires. It is not needed to aid in the execution of a major life
activity; the employee may remediate her inabilities or deficiencies
that she has as she will, without permission from or resort to an em-
ployer, but the accommodation almost always functions to enable the
employee to retain her employment despite her impairment. For exam-
ple, an employee who requires aid in the actual execution of a major
life activity will typically take it upon herself to procure a cane, hear-
ing aid, or medication that aids in digestion. It is only for a workplace
172. See Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2003).
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accommodation—a grant of extra time to complete work, a flexible
schedule to work while receiving treatment, or extra assistance in any
form with work—that an employee must typically resort to her em-
ployer, and ultimately, to the law of the ADA. There is simply no
reason to retain the arbitrary requirement that the employee point to a
limitation of a major life activity that may or may not be implicated or
otherwise aided by an accommodation.
A cancer patient’s limited ability to reproduce or to fight off in-
fection is likely of limited concern to her employer as long as she
reports to work and performs well. However, what may be of concern
is the looming prospect that her cancer may return and that the em-
ployer will not be able to rely on her continued health and progress at
work. The law has already recognized that even if she cannot yet point
to an extant limitation on her major life activities, she should enjoy
protection from the bias that her disease conjures up. It should also
acknowledge that if she needs a flexible work schedule in order to
receive treatment, and if such a change is a reasonable accommodation
under the circumstances, her employer is likely denying her the re-
quest out of the same desire to evade the cost and inconvenience that
the employer shows if it refuses to hire or retain her in the first place.
No greater or additional purpose is served by withholding the reasona-
ble accommodation from an employee who is protected under the anti-
discrimination mandate.
Further, no benefit is derived by adhering to the fiction that a
given reasonable accommodation should always aid the employee in
better performing a major life activity (such as with Denise Felix173)
or being a better employee (flexible scheduling, for example, enables
the employee to stay employed while treating the impairment, but it
may or may not affect the employee’s work performance). The true
purpose of the reasonable accommodation provision is to help ensure
that an otherwise qualified individual deemed worthy of inclusion
within the statute’s protection is given the assistance that he or she
needs to obtain, perform, or retain the job that she holds or desires.
2. A Final Note in Light of the ADAAA’s Expansion of the Law’s
Conception of a Major Life Activity
Since the ADAAA now includes major bodily functions and epi-
sodic impairment, even if the impairment is in remission, in its defini-
173. See Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2003) (reading
the reasonable accommodation requirement to require a connection to an impairment
of a major life activity).
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tion of “major life activities,” a large number of individuals who
would have been adjudged either “regarded as” disabled or even not
disabled at all will be found to be disabled within the meaning of the
act. Fewer people for whom the legislation was originally passed will
now fall through the proverbial cracks. That said, the major life activ-
ity requirement is still unnecessary, and it will likely continue to un-
fairly and needlessly screen out plaintiffs who merit a reasonable
accommodation, as well as many of those to whom the Felix/causal
nexus requirement applies. The unambiguous goal of the ADAAA
was to expand coverage under the ADA; this is evident from its plain
language, as well as from its legislative history.174 It therefore makes
no sense for the ADA to retain its language requiring the substantial
limitation of a major life activity in order for a plaintiff to warrant
coverage. The best way to ensure that cases the ADA was not in-
tended to reach are screened and foreclosed is to properly execute and
employ the relevant analysis for determining whether someone cov-
ered by the statute is otherwise qualified for the position at issue,
whether the proposed accommodation is reasonable, and whether or
not it confers an undue hardship upon the employer.
B. The “Otherwise Qualified”/“Reasonable Accommodation”/
“Undue Hardship” Analysis Should be Re-
Conceptualized
Once it is determined that someone is presumptively covered by
the ADA by having a non-minor, non-temporary impairment, the fol-
lowing analysis should aim to capture those scenarios where Congress
contemplated protecting plaintiffs and to screen out non-meritorious
cases. In other words, the statute’s application should level the playing
field, so that qualified, valuable, but disabled employees may be suc-
cessfully integrated into American workplaces, while employers are
permitted to retain and exercise their prerogative to select the most
valued and skilled employees for their businesses. In order to achieve
this result, the overall analysis, of which the courts have left the sub-
stance and framework less than certain, should be re-conceptualized,
and the requirement that an otherwise qualified employee be able to
174. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A) (“The definition of
disability shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act,
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”); see also Long, supra
note 124, at 229 (“Although there are still numerous issues that remain unresolved, R
many of the changes that Congress did make were long overdue and are likely to
provide greater coverage at the initial stage of determining whether an individual has
a disability than existed previously under the Act.”).
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perform all of the job’s essential functions with or without accommo-
dation should be changed to require that she be able to demonstrate all
of the necessary job skills without any accommodation.
Even if the major life activity limitation requirement is elimi-
nated, there should still be several junctures in the analysis to screen
for plaintiffs whose cases should survive summary judgment. Under
the existing reasonable accommodation analysis,175 a tripartite query
takes place whereby the court ascertains whether a disabled plaintiff is
an otherwise qualified individual, whether the proposed accommoda-
tion is reasonable, and whether or not the proposed accommodation
confers an undue hardship on the employer. As stated, jurists, schol-
ars, and practitioners differ sharply as to the relationship and interplay
among the three. For the most part, before the enactment of the
ADAAA, the “otherwise qualified” analysis was subsumed and even
eclipsed by the disability/coverage analysis, as discussed above. The
other two pieces of the puzzle—the reasonableness analysis and the
undue hardship analysis—have been alternately described as two sides
of the same coin,176 mirror images with their respective burdens con-
ferred on the respective parties,177 and wholly distinct and indepen-
dent from one another.178 It is surprising, given the state of confusion
of the law on this very crucial point, that the ADAAA did not address
it. This is especially confounding considering that the ADAAA’s ex-
175. See generally Matejkovic & Matejkovic, supra note 169 (discussing how the R
ADA’s accommodation requirement remains underdeveloped).
176. See Weber, supra note 67, at 1124 (“Reasonable accommodation and undue R
hardship are two sides of the same coin.”).
177. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 12–13 (1996) (“The distinction between
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship survives mainly in the procedural
form of allocating the burden of proof between the disabled individual and the em-
ployer.  The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that reasonable accommodation is
possible.  Once such an accommodation is identified, the employer bears the burden
of showing that it would result in undue hardship.”). But see U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002) (indicating that “reasonable accommodation” is not
a mirror image of “undue hardship”).
178. See Jean Fitzpatrick Galanos & Stephen H. Price, Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: Concepts & Considerations for State & Local Government
Employers, 21 STETSON L. REV. 931, 948 (1992) (“It is therefore important to note the
distinction between undue hardship and reasonable accommodation: Undue hardship
is a defense to, rather than an aspect of, reasonable accommodation.”); Jason Zarin,
Note, Beyond the Bright Line: Consideration of Externalities, the Meaning of Undue
Hardship, and the Allocation of the Burden of Proof Under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 511, 534 (1998) (“If undue hardship is
treated simply as the failure of an accommodation to be reasonable, then any distinc-
tion between the tests is eviscerated, rendering the undue hardship language of the
ADA superfluous.  Thus, to give effect to Congress’s intent, reasonable accommoda-
tion and undue hardship need to be given independent meanings.”).
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pansion of coverage will effectively push the question of what is and
is not a reasonable accommodation to the forefront in many more
cases, necessitating a more workable construction and framework.
It is thus the case that the “otherwise qualified” analysis should
be given more centrality in the reasonable accommodation analysis,
and Congress should proceed to revisit the terminology for defining
that which an otherwise qualified plaintiff must be able to do.
1. Background on the “Otherwise Qualified” Analysis
The “otherwise qualified” analysis asks whether a disabled plain-
tiff can perform the essential functions of the job that he has or desires
with or without a reasonable accommodation. This analysis has been
largely ignored by courts and scholars, but it ought to be a much more
integral part of a reasonableness analysis.
A few courts, however, have recognized that when identifying
and defining essential functions for a given position, “[p]recision is
critical, as the level of generality at which the essential functions are
defined can be outcome determinative.”179 Although the term “essen-
tial functions” is not defined in the ADA, it has been defined in the
statute’s implementing regulations, promulgated by the EEOC as the
“fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual
with a disability holds or desires,” not including “the marginal func-
tions of the position.”180 The regulations set forth three nonexclusive
reasons as to why a job function may be considered essential: (1) the
position exists for “the purpose of performing the function;” (2) there
are a “limited number of employees available among whom responsi-
bility for the function can be distributed;” and/or (3) the function is
“highly specialized” and the incumbent was hired for his or her exper-
tise or ability to perform it.181
Courts that have spent time on the otherwise qualified analysis
have traditionally dealt with the complexity of discerning what is and
is not an essential function by recognizing that the analysis “involves
fact-sensitive considerations and must be determined on a case-by-
179. Richardson v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2002); Skerski v.
Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2001)).
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2010).
181. Id. Courts adjudicating ADA cases and interpreting the statute often look to the
EEOC Interpretive Guidance, which was published as an appendix to the regulations
implementing Title I of the Act. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,739 (July 26, 1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630).
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case basis.”182 Under the regulations, the kinds of evidence that ought
to inform the analysis are:
[1] The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential;
[2] Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or inter-
viewing applicants for the job; [3] The amount of time spent on the
job performing the function; [4] The consequences of not requiring
the incumbent to perform the function; [5] The terms of a collective
bargaining agreement; [6] The work experience of past incumbents
in the job; and/or [7] The current work experience of incumbents in
similar jobs.183
Moreover, “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judg-
ment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing ap-
plicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of
the essential functions of the job.”184 While the plaintiff retains the
burden of establishing that she is an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability, the burden is on the employer to proffer evidence
that a given function is essential. Courts are charged with walking a
very fine line between deferring to the legitimate managerial preroga-
tive of employers to structure positions and run operations as they see
fit and refusing to accept wholesale a self-serving job description from
an employer seeking to thwart and evade the ADA’s application.185
Moreover, courts have acknowledged that a function may be “neces-
sary,” and thus “essential,” even if it is not “primary,”186 meaning that
an employee may still need to perform a function in the run of her
employment even if that function is not one of the primary things that
the employee was hired to do or something that must be done fre-
quently or for a long time.187
182. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 2002).
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2010).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
185. See Gillen, 283 F.3d at 25 (“The purpose of these provisions is not to enable
courts to second-guess legitimate business judgments, but, rather, to ensure that an
employer’s asserted requirements are solidly anchored in the realities of the work-
place, not constructed out of whole cloth,” though “the employer’s good-faith view of
what a job entails, though important, is not dispositive.”).
186. Richardson v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 78 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The
essential functions of a position are not limited to the ‘primary’ function of the
position.”).
187. See, e.g., Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 56, 58 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that a
claims adjudicator needed to be able to furnish advice to other employees despite the
fact that the “core function” of the position was adjudicating claims); Frazier v. Sim-
mons, 254 F.3d 1247, 1259–61 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that a criminal investigator
needed to be able to restrain violent people despite the fact that the primary functions
of the investigator position required no physical exertion).
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2. How the Analysis Should be Positioned, Structured, and
Worded
This overlooked piece of the reasonable accommodation analysis
ought to be the threshold query, and it ought to screen cases more
carefully than it currently does. Inasmuch as the major life activity
limitation requirement is dropped and no longer serves an artificial
screening function, the otherwise qualified analysis ought to be
strengthened and should be seen as serving a legitimate screening
function. The major life activity limitation requirement can, as previ-
ously discussed, unjustly prevent certain plaintiffs from basic consid-
eration under the statute. The elimination of the major life activity
requirement may therefore be seen as shifting the screening function
from whether a plaintiff who has a non-minor, non-temporary impair-
ment is disabled within the meaning of the statute to the question of
whether that plaintiff is properly deemed otherwise qualified for the
position in question. The otherwise qualified analysis should assess
whether a given plaintiff is viable for a given position and valuable to
the employer despite requiring an outlay of resources by the employer
in order to remain employed.
The otherwise qualified analysis should be first and primary
among the tripartite strands of consideration that comprise the other-
wise qualified/reasonable accommodation/undue hardship analysis. In
fact, a close look at the otherwise qualified provision of the statute
shows that it actually implicates the other two strands of the analysis
already by defining an otherwise qualified employee as one who, with
or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the position that she has or desires. However, designating
one who is “otherwise qualified” as one who can perform a job’s es-
sential functions with a reasonable accommodation effectively sub-
sumes and bypasses the question of whether an accommodation is
reasonable, and by extension, whether it confers an undue hardship on
an employer.188
The rule should instead be that when a non-minor, non-transitory
impairment that is the but-for cause of one’s need for a reasonable
accommodation in order to become or remain employed, an accom-
modation is warranted where the employee is otherwise qualified,
188. But see W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights
of People with Disabilities and John Rawls’s Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L.
REV. 295, 298 (1992) (“[T]he inflexibility of the essential-functions test is perhaps the
major legal barrier to the achievement of equality unimpeded by such disabilities.”).
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meaning that he or she already possesses the necessary job skills prior
to receiving any employer-furnished accommodation.
This formulation separates out the three strands of the analysis
and organizes them so that the “reasonable accommodation” analysis
becomes distinct from others and directly addresses the accommoda-
tion itself. The undue hardship analysis should focus on the specifics
of the employer and anything about it—its size, resources, or location,
for example—that might render an otherwise reasonable accommoda-
tion unreasonable. The otherwise qualified strand, however, should fo-
cus entirely on the plaintiff: specifically, whether she is competitive
for the position from the employer’s view, with respect to necessary
skills, before any accommodation enters the analysis.
This emphasis on necessary skills accomplishes several things.
First, it recognizes and respects the employer’s natural desire to hire
the candidates and retain the employees who emerge as most qualified
for a position because, at a basic level, they possess the skills that the
employer seeks and values for the position. Second, it ensures that the
reasonable accommodation will be one that helps an employee to ex-
hibit, demonstrate, or utilize the necessary skills and talents sought,
rather than obviating the need for them to do so. Finally, it comports
with the goal of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate,
which is to ensure that qualified people who are protected under the
statute and need a reasonable modicum of help to perform their jobs
satisfactorily get the aid that they need.
The fact is that employees are not valued or valuable (that is, they
are not hired, retained, and promoted) because of their abilities to per-
form certain major life activities. One would be hard-pressed to find
an employer who specifically placed value on an employee’s ability
to, for example, sleep, eat, or reproduce. However, employees are also
not valued merely to attain desired results through any means possible.
Thus, for example, an employee who could only accomplish some-
thing that she was hired to do by requesting that someone else do it is
not proving valuable. Only an employee with the skills valued by an
employer as the means by which to get to a desired end result should
be deemed “otherwise qualified” by the statute; the employee’s ability
to perform major life activities and her ability to attain desired results
via any potential means are equally irrelevant.
For an illustrative example, take a blind attorney in a wheel-
chair.189 His disabilities impair his major life activities of seeing and
189. Cf. Bruce M. Familant, Comment, The Essential Functions of Being A Lawyer
with A Non-Visible Disability: On the Wings of A Kiwi Bird, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\14-2\NYL210.txt unknown Seq: 49 19-APR-11 14:14
2011] SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS 557
walking. Just as obviously, one of the functions his employer desires
from him is the production of excellent legal briefs. The necessary
skills, however, that this or any other attorney would need in order to
be considered a competitive candidate for employment, retention, or
promotion, are neither the major life activities of seeing or walking,
nor are they the ultimate generation of the desired end product. Rather,
they are the underlying skills needed to craft a good legal brief: sound
analytical research and drafting abilities. To the extent that the attor-
ney possesses these valued or essential abilities, he establishes himself
as a valuable candidate or employee who, but for bias due to his need
for accommodation, would likely be hired, retained, and promoted by
the employer. Similarly, to the extent that he lacks the ability to physi-
cally access the building without the reasonable accommodation of an
accessible entranceway, this inability is not the lack of a valued or
necessary skill that a lawyer ought to possess, and it should not render
him anything other than otherwise qualified.
On the other hand, just as a blind bus driver lacks the necessary
ability to drive a bus because he cannot see, so does a lawyer who
lacks research, analytical, and, depending on the nature of the job,
perhaps interpersonal skills, lack the necessary skills for his or her job.
“Otherwise qualified” should thus be defined in terms of the skills or
abilities that the employee already possesses prior to the receipt of an
employer-furnished accommodation, rather than as it is currently de-
fined: the ability to perform the essential functions of the job at issue,
with or without reasonable accommodation.190 This reform would
both remove the confusing, unhelpful concept of the “essential func-
tion” and dislodge the related, but distinct, reasonable accommodation
question from the otherwise qualified analysis.
The confusion that courts evince when executing the “otherwise
qualified” analysis illustrates the deficiencies of its current composi-
tion and state. The problem with the “essential function” element of
the “otherwise qualified” analysis191 is that it is too vague to capture
the notion that a plaintiff may be truly “qualified” for the position, and
have the skills the employer seeks, but, due to a disability, requires
reasonable aid to do anything ranging from physically accessing the
517, 520–21 (1998) (discussing the essential functions of being a lawyer and address-
ing why public policy should mandate reasonable accommodations for lawyers with
non-visible disabilities).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006) (“The term ‘qualified individual’ means an indi-
vidual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”) (empha-
sis added).
191. See id. § 12111(8).
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workplace to performing required tasks. Defining an “essential func-
tion” as the end “function” that needs to be performed can beg the
question implicated because with enough help (say, getting someone
else to perform the function for the employee), virtually anyone can
perform any function. The question will boil down to whether the ac-
commodation proposed is, in fact, a reasonable one—which is sup-
posed to be the focus of the next part of the analysis.
Take, for example, Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,192 a
2009 case involving an insurance salesman whose
bipolar disorder affected his ability to do his job in a variety of
ways. His focus and concentration were impaired, and he had diffi-
culty prioritizing and completing work. Most tasks took him longer
than in the past to accomplish, and he had difficulty transitioning
from one task to the next. Multiple witnesses testified about the
jumble of papers that typically covered his desk. Stress tended to
worsen his problems in managing his workload. [His] limitations
made it difficult for him to find prospective customers in sufficient
numbers to meet the company’s sales goals. Although [he] had ac-
cumulated a large “book” of business over the years-insurance poli-
cies that renewed and continued to bring in significant profits in
annual premiums-by the early 1990s he began to routinely fall short
of annual quotas for new policy sales.193
Tobin requested an accommodation in the form of increased sup-
port staff to respond to customer service calls, and an assignment to
manage a “Mass Marketing” (MM) account.194 Such an account, how-
ever, was highly desired by all of the sales people who worked for the
defendant.195 Nonetheless, Tobin argued that with an MM account,
“he would have been able to overcome the difficulties caused by his
disability, and could have met his quotas.”196 With this argument,
however, Tobin almost appeared to be defining an “essential function”
of his job as “meeting quotas” rather than exhibiting the requisite and
valued skills that a salesperson needs in order to accomplish that
goal.197 Although the court evaluated whether the proposed accommo-
dation “would have compensated for the disadvantages caused by his
disability without altering the essential functions of his job,”198 this is
192. 553 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009), aff’g, No. 01-11979, 2007 WL 967860 (Mar. 29,
2007).
193. Id. at 126.
194. Id. at 127.
195. Id.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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not equivalent to a proper analysis as to whether Tobin could exhibit
the necessary skills needed to perform the job, such that with an ac-
commodation, he could accomplish the tasks and goals required. The
“otherwise qualified” test should embody this latter analysis, and it is
this analysis through which unmeritorious cases should be screened,
rather than the artificial “major life activity” requirement for those
with serious impairments seeking reasonable accommodation under
the ADA.
Tobin produced evidence to show that “he had difficulty finding
prospective clients, but that he had good closing skills once he was
engaged in a sales call,”199 even as his employer argued that finding
prospective clients was a central challenge that made making quota
difficult and was therefore an “essential function.”200 The defendant,
Liberty Mutual, also argued that it allocated MM accounts, almost like
rewards, “on the basis of merit to sales representatives who were ac-
tively pursuing other such accounts and who otherwise were meeting
their sales quotas.”201 Even the court acknowledged that Tobin’s re-
quest for an MM account was made “in the belief that the logistical
convenience of such accounts would offset the deficits in his perform-
ance that were attributable to his disability.”202
By raising the stress-management, organizational, and time-man-
agement skills needed to handle an MM account, the company tried to
demonstrate that the plaintiff could not have done the job even if he
were given the accommodation of an MM assignment.203 However, if
the “essential function” of the sales job were not conceived of as the
end game of making quota and handling the account, but as exhibiting
the necessary skills of a successful sales person who recruits and
keeps business before special accounts are allocated, as the defendant
initially urged,204 the defendant would not even have had to go this
far.
The First Circuit ultimately found that “[a]mple evidence sup-
ports the conclusion that Tobin’s illness significantly impaired his
ability to meet his sales goals,” but it did not explain in detail how or
why this was so.205 The district court in Tobin had initially granted
summary judgment to the defendant because, among other reasons,
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 137.
203. Id. at 127.
204. Id. at 127–28.
205. Id. at 137.
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“more mass marketing accounts would likely have led to increased
sales for any sales representative, whether disabled or not . . . .
[A]ssignment of mass marketing accounts would, therefore, have been
functionally equivalent to altering job performance requirements and
quotas, which the ADA does not require of employers.”206 The First
Circuit, however, found there to be a triable issue of fact as to whether
giving Tobin MM accounts would have changed the essential func-
tions of his position, namely “prospecting” new accounts.207 It found
that because the defendant had come forward with no evidence to sup-
port its argument, whereas Tobin had proffered the discretion that the
defendant afforded itself in assigning MM accounts, there were mate-
rial issues of fact in dispute “as to how MM accounts were assigned,
and, ultimately, as to the nature of Tobin’s essential job require-
ments.”208 The court sent the case to a jury, and Tobin emerged
victorious.
The court noted that an accommodation request for a benefit is
not unreasonable merely because the employee has not met the bene-
fit’s stated eligibility requirements, noting that “[s]uch a conclusion
would turn the ADA’s accommodation requirement on its head.”209
This observation in the context of the Tobin case, however, misses the
mark, because the court’s observation, like the statute itself, does not
elaborate upon or clarify ambiguous terms like “eligibility require-
ments” or “essential functions.” Employers need to retain the ability to
select the most skilled and “competitive” candidates for employment
while simultaneously refraining from discriminating against an indi-
vidual due to that individual’s disability. Under the statute’s scheme,
an employer’s failure to afford a reasonable accommodation is a type
of discrimination against someone who is otherwise qualified, but is
not enumerated alongside the ADA’s antidiscrimination mandate.210
206. Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.01-11979, 2004 WL 1922133, at *10
(D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2004).
207. Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 108 (1st Cir. 2005).
208. Id.
209. Tobin, 553 F.3d at 137 (citing U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397,
398 (2002)).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2006) (“‘[D]iscriminat[ion] against a quali-
fied individual on the basis of disability’ includes . . . not making reasonable accom-
modations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business of such covered entity; or denying employment opportu-
nities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasona-
ble accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or
applicant.”).
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This underscores the fact that only when a failure to accommodate is
properly seen as discrimination against someone with the necessary
skills and talents to acquire the job is that failure actionable under the
statute.
Moreover, the level of screening provided by the proposed “oth-
erwise qualified” analysis is sensitive to the legitimate desires of em-
ployers to hire and retain those with the most competitive underlying
skill set without having to focus on the ambiguous reference to the
job’s essential functions. For example, is physically accessing the
workplace an essential function? Is making a sales quota an essential
function—in the abstract and irrespective of how it is made? In addi-
tion, it does not unduly insinuate a reasonable accommodation analy-
sis into what should be an examination of the plaintiff. The shift of the
screen from the almost irrelevant major life activity limitation analysis
to a (now) more restrictive otherwise qualified analysis ensures that
employers’ legitimate prerogatives are honored while the essential an-
tidiscrimination mandate of the ADA remains in full force. In this
way, the ultimate goal of the statute is best met.
Without an interpreter, a deaf salesperson cannot deploy his val-
ued skills and meet his sales goals. A salesperson who lacks valued,
essential skills, like the ability to get along well with others and good
interpersonal skills, however, is not similarly situated, and the “other-
wise qualified” analysis should bring out this fact if it is to be effec-
tive. Thus, while hearing is the major life activity that is impeded by
the salesperson’s disability, and making a sales quota is the end result,
based on the tenets and goals underlying the ADA, it should be clear
that the valued, necessary skills described should be the criteria for
deeming the salesman “otherwise qualified” for the position.
On the other hand, however, a defendant who can show that a
salesman lacks the time management and “people skills” valued, and
indeed, necessary to make sales, ought to be able to establish that the
plaintiff is not “otherwise qualified.” This is comparable to a defen-
dant being asked to accommodate a blind bus driver. The court in
Tobin, however, refused to hold that he was, as a matter of law, not
“otherwise qualified,” seeming to conflate that issue with the issue of
whether the proposed accommodation was reasonable. Even though
the court conceded that “[t]he record supports Tobin’s belief that MM
accounts were a fertile source of new sales,”211 it refused to hold that
211. 553 F.3d at 137 n.18.
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Tobin, unable to make quota without the MM account benefits, was
not otherwise qualified.212
If the statute and its regulations had led the Tobin court to focus
on the essential or necessary abilities of a salesman who worked for
the defendant, instead of the tasks he was expected to ultimately ac-
complish, the court would likely have been able to use the “otherwise
qualified” analysis to prevent the case from getting to a jury. Instead,
the employer’s reservation of discretion for itself prevented it from
refusing to excuse the plaintiff’s lack of valued, necessary skills. If the
law prompted the defendant to establish why the very skills that Tobin
was found to lack—such as focus, concentration, and prioritization
and completion of work—were essential and necessary, and why his
proposed accommodation obviated the need for him to exhibit them
rather than aiding him in attaining them, the defendant would have
prevailed easily, before it got to trial. The focus never should have
been, as it ultimately was, on how rewards were meted out, but rather
on the core abilities needed by a valued employee, let alone a re-
warded one.
Thus, where a talented, blind attorney requests that her employer
provide her with Braille books, the essential function of the job should
not be defined as seeing (the major life activity), nor should it be de-
fined as winning cases (the ultimate objective). Rather, what is “essen-
tial” is the ability to perform legal research and write well-researched
and -written briefs. After all, if the essential function is defined as
seeing, the plaintiff will never be able to attain it, with or without
accommodation;213 and if it is defined as winning, one might posit
that bribing a judge or hiring another attorney to do that attorney’s job
could bring about a victory. The otherwise qualified analysis is best
executed by carefully defining what aspects of the job are needed and
valued in terms of the input required from the employee, and not the
accomplishment of the ultimate goals assigned.
Once a plaintiff has been deemed otherwise qualified, courts may
evaluate whether the proposed accommodation is reasonable, and then
evaluate whether it confers an undue hardship on the employer.
CONCLUSION
This Article, in the spirit of Senator Kennedy and his crusade to
help the disabled attain societal equality, has evaluated the ADAAA’s
effects and likely impact. It has also, with the goals of the ADA, the
212. Id. at 139–40.
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006) (defining a “qualified individual”).
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ADAAA, and Senator Kennedy in mind, made suggestions for further
reform of the statute—specifically, it has suggested that the major life
activity limitation requirement be eliminated from the statute, but that
the otherwise qualified analysis be strengthened by supplanting the
query into a job’s “essential functions” and whether an employee can
perform them with or without reasonable accommodation with a query
into whether an employee comes into the workplace with the neces-
sary skills that the employer seeks when hiring, retaining, or promot-
ing employees. If plaintiffs are required to display these skills with no
accommodation by the employer, the focus of the otherwise qualified
query will change. Instead of implicating the larger question of what
would constitute a reasonable accommodation, the query would simul-
taneously compel inclusion of the disabled in the workplace and en-
sure that employers were only required to hire, retain, and
accommodate those who, but for their impairment, would be truly
competitive for the positions at issue.
For many years, the structure, wording, and application of the
question of whether the ADA had been violated served to foreclose
plaintiffs with viable cases from proceeding. The underlying goals of
the statute and its architects, like Senator Kennedy, were thwarted and
obfuscated. The ADAAA should be heralded as a huge legislative ac-
complishment, but opportunities for further reform should not be
overlooked.
The elimination of the major life activity requirement from the
statute’s coverage requirements may seem drastic at first blush, but
upon a review of the jurisprudence and goals of the ADA, it becomes
apparent that it need not play a role in restricting the statute’s protec-
tions to those within the contemplation of Congress when it drafted
and then revised the legislation. To the extent that the requirement has
functioned as a screen of sorts for the legislation, this function would
be better served by strengthening and reconceptualizing the “other-
wise qualified” query posed by the statute. This revised inquiry, as
proposed in this paper, would work to effectively screen out cases in
which recognizing plaintiffs’ rights would not further the goals of the
statute or take into account the countervailing goals and interests of
employers, as recognized by the ADA. Thus, in the process of remov-
ing the major life activity limitation requirement as a barrier to inclu-
sion under the statute, defendants should not be threatened with the
loss of their core prerogative to require certain skills and abilities of
employees.
Ideas for reforming disability discrimination legislation and juris-
prudence should be developed in furtherance of the goals envisioned
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by the architects of protective legislation like Senator Kennedy. It is
only by continually revisiting the legislation and jurisprudence that
surrounds this and other compelling societal issues that the setbacks
and loopholes the case law has engendered over decades may be over-
come and closed. It is only with the creativity, audacity, and concern
for all interests that Senator Kennedy displayed during his epic career
that such effective reform can begin to take place.
